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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE

This book seeks to identify legal principles and rules influencing
and governing the uses of outer space. It suggests reasonable applications of such principles and rules. It proceeds upon the basis that
the international law of outer space now possesses content and scope.
It recognizes that this law, in its rapidly emerging condition, is particularly influenced by political-legal dynamics.
It is not the province of this volume to provide final answers to the
issues and problems analyzed. Yet, this limitation-if it is a limita:tion-does not invalidate the importance of understanding current
approaches to the law of outer space.
In order to understand today's law of outer space it is necessary to
comprehend the facts of today's social complex, including the revolutionary tempo which contributes so materially to the changes and
challenges of the Twentieth Century. 1 All of the elements of the so1 The past six million years of the earth's existence has been compared with
a t\venty-four hour day, and on such a scale all of man's notable achievements
have been accomplished within much less than the last split second of the last
second of the day. A similar comparison was made by President John F. Kennedy on September 13, 1962. In a talk entitled "The Space Challenge," he stated:
"No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if
you will, the 50,000 years of man's recorded history in a timespan of but half
a century. Stated in these terms we know very little about the first 40 years,
except at the end of them advanced man had learned to use the skins of
animals to cover him.
"Then about 10 years ago under this standard man emerged from his cave to
construct other kinds of shelter. Only 5 years ago man learned to write and use
a cart with wheels.
"Christianity began less than 2 years ago. The printing press came this year
and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50-year span of human
history, the steam engine provided a new source of power. Newton explored the
meaning of gravity.
·
"Last month, electric lights and telephones and automobiles and airplanes
became available. Only last week did we develop penicillin and television and
nuclear power.
"And now if America's new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, [this was
accomplished on December 14, 1962] we will have literally reached the stars
before midnight tonight. This is a breathtaking pace and such a pace cannot
help but create new ills as it dispels old, new ignorance, new problems, new
dangers." 28 Vital Speeches 738 (October 1, 1962.)
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cial complex have in1posed highly significant and extraordinarily
substantial demands upon the hun1an species in the space age.
By the social complex I 1nean those forces or factors which affect
1nankind. They necessarily include social, cultural, religious, ethical,
aesthetic, economic, political, 1nilitary, scientific, technological, racial, ideological, lingual, and legal considerations. ~{any include ilnportant subdivisions. For example, the economic factor might be
further divided to include financial, commercial, industrial, labor,
agricultural, and 1nanagerial categories.
For the purposes of this study political and legal forces are of
singular importance and very similar. It is the function of political
forces to take into account the art of the possible. Legal forces emphasize the use of given processes in order to achieve certain socially
desirable goals or purposes. Although there may not be universal
agreement as to the purposes to be served by legal processes, yet
there is general agremnent that, 'vhatever the la'v is, it is subject to
enforcement-by sanctions, physical or otherwise.
It should be remembered that many of the elements of the social
complex are nor1native in nature, that is, there is a high degree of
"oughtness" in their composition. This is particularly true of religious, ethical, social, ideological, and legal forces. The latter is normative because of the impact 1nade upon it by religious, ethical (or
moral), social, and ideological demands. 2
Thus, it should be understood at the outset that national and international interests in outer space must take into account the highly
interrelated and complex forces which for purposes of brevity have
been designated as the social complex. These forces are multidimensional in significance. They affect the important figure of this studyInan-in inner space, on the surface of the globe, in the atmosphere,
and in outer space. Thus, despite the new physical dimensions into
\vhich 1nan now extends his presence and his influence, from the legal
point of view the environmental di1nension is not central to this
analysis. The la'v of outer space, just as all la,v, is designed for man
and must serve his co1nplex needs. l\ian's behavior, then, is the focal
point of this study.
The ne\v tempo of mankind~s existence is matched only by the novelty of man's conquest of outer space and the creative and iinaginative excite1nent 'vhich this has generated. The proliferation of
This has been portrayed by a former President of the American Bar Association, who bas written: "The rule of law means the rule of reason under the
moral standards developed by the experience of man. Traditional moral values
underlie law principles. These values have their roots deep in the conscience of
humanity." Rhyne, "World Peace Through Law," 3 Student Law J. 6 (1960).
2
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writing flowing :from lawyers and others close to centers of policy
:formulation has been effervescent and divergent. These :factors have
de1nonstrated the need to put into analytical-even though tentativeform a statement of the la'v of outer space.
It has been reported that the leading newspaper of an important
North American city ran an immodest but arresting headline on October 4, 1957, proclaiming the
orld Series successes of its teams.
Only in the inner recesses of the journal could one learn that on that
historic day man's first earth-launched, artificial satellite was ranging through the :fairly proximate distances of outer space. In the
short intervening years outer space has become more a part of our,
and, indeed, world life than even baseball.
How has this co1ne about? And 'vhat kind of principles or rules
have been devised for the participants in the outer space contest 1
Because it is a 1nost important struggle it could perhaps be expected
that :formal rules governing 1nan's use of outer space would by now
have been stated. Only relatively modest and somewhat tentative
practical legal notions have so far been attained, despite the energetic thought given to the n1atter of principles and nlles.
The limited legal achievements 1nay be due to the fact that outer
space is indeed a 1nore co1nplex matter than baseball. To carry the
comparison a step further it no'v appears that the major participants
in outer space activities have been waiting to see what the pitchers
have to offer and what kind of hop the ball was going to take before
an earnest effort was made to agree upon applicable legal principles
and the :formalization of specific rules. 3 The te1npo of events, however, is :forcing policy decisions prior to the unfolding of ultimate
:facts.
l\ioreover, as the space age develops, and as international problems
respecting outer space proceed a pace, the contest itself is developing
some of its own norms. 4 Thus, a ne'v and intriguing area of customary international space la'v is unfolding. It relies initially, and is
still based very largely, on usage or practice. l\iuch is implicit but is
bolstered by :formal national declarations and international resolutions. Concurrently, there is also a limited development of space law
through other and more formal processes.
The tempo of our times, largely aided and abetted by our newest
scientific and technological revolution, and influenced materially by
long-ranging and significantly creative efforts in science and techno!-
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See pages 119-183 for a more extended analysis of "approaches" to the
development of the law of outer space.
4
See pages 115-175 for an analysis of the development of a customary law
·o f outer space.
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ogy, has produced de1nands for certain uses of outer space. Pyralniding practical dmnands have de1nonstrated a singular aw·areness
of n1an's potential uses of outer space. Thus, at this time the 1nain
sti·eain of 1nan's expectations has been for reasonable-indeed, peace·
ful-uses of outer space. 5 For, n1an in these tempestuous times is
a ''"are that he lives not only in the era of space but in the age of the
aton1. And he seeks such security in outer space as 1nay be supplied
by the application of la'v to such an environn1ent.
It 'vas in these circumstances that Lieutenant Colonel John H.
Glenn, Jr., observed in 1962 following his successful space flight:
" . A.s our kno,vledge of the universe in 'rhich ''e live increases, may
God grant us the \Yisdom and guidance to use it 'visely."
l\fuch the sa1ne has beco1ne an urgent article of faith for much of
1nankind. l\fan's predican1ent and his expectations have been put for·
w·ard by Gerard Piel, as follo,vs:
e .have come suddenly and un·
prepared to the fork in the road. As each day passes \Ve lose the
po,ver of decision and are carried into the road that leads to no
future at all.
e cannot avert our self-destruction unless \Ye take up
the cause of 1nan * * * In the kno,vledge that confers the capacity to
destroy, man has gained equally the capacity to realize his humanity
* * * " 6 It does seem clear that man's scientific and technological
genius has provided him 'vith the opportunity to eliminate human
deprivations and to advance his inherent capabilities. At the same
ti1ne he has developed capabilities equal to the task of destroying life
and civilization as ''e no'v kno'v it.
The challenges to the legal profession are patently real. The international la,vyer 'vith a subject as important and dynamic as this can
serve many purposes. Not the least of his opportunities is the act of
identifying problems. l-Ie may also offer tentative and occasionally
even n1ore definitive ans\vers.
A lawyer in addressing himself to a task such as this one must
avoid the luxury of unconsciously making basic assumptions about
the substance of his subject. It should be repeated that this is particularly necessary where, as here, the political-legal qualities of the
subject are so closely related.
Because of this it is ''ell to acknowledge that the demand for and
gro,vth of a la \V of outer space is being substantially influenced by
1nnn's ancient quest for security, as \vell as by his inherent search for
self-realization. The pri1nacy of security is reflected by 1nan's unqual-
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5 See pages 114-118, 178-181, 2G3-318 for a more detailed analysis of this
matter. As will be demonstrated, peaceful uses may include military uses when
the latter are nonaggressive and beneficial in their employment.
6 Piel, Science in the Cause of IJ!an, vii (1961).
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ified and hopeful demand £or control over outer space. Early
'vritings on the subject o£ outer space have stressed man's concern
lest this environment be used adversely to his earthly interests. Since
this is a central £actor in man's thinking, it is hardly surprising that
this concern has also occupied policy planners and decision makers
ever since man's space capabilities caine to be more fully realized.
There seems to be no doubt that this aspect o£ outer space will continue to occupy a nationally oriented 1nankind and be central to the
existing 'vorld decisional process, thus controlling and influencing all
other uses and thought concerning space.
On the other hand, self-realization insists that the uses o£ outer
space be as wide indeed as all o£ man's vastly ranging interests,
which are international as well as national in their focus. Restrictions on the use o£ outer space and demands £or full use will have to
be balanced in the white flame o£ competing interests. 7 It is fair to
say that the jurisprudence o£ interests has now arrived at outer
space. The catalyst in these experiences, and indeed the balance
'vheel, it is sub1nitted, will be the concept o£ reasonableness.
Therefore, it is one o£ the fundamental assumptions o£ the author
that, through the development and clarification o£ a law o£ outer
space, certain benefits will extend to mankind. I£ law is capable o£
taming or modifying power in this new environment, as it has in
many others, then great benefits to man will surely obtain. There
could be such results as a higher degree o£ international security, a
broader view o£ the nature o£ reasonable uses, and such other o£
n1an's essential values, which nation-states seek to supply or encourage, as order, health, economic stability, scientific and technological
advancement, an appreciation for moral and spiritual values, and the
general welfare o£ the individual-in sum, all o£ the characteristics
o£ a n1ore enlightened age. 8
Thus, a part o£ man's challenge is his capacity to learn to live with
lively and multi-purposed space vehicles. In the interest o£ orderand perhaps o£ survival-he must acquire a willingness to use them
reasonably. In this effort law has a traditional and principal role to
play.
In addition to the identification o£ goals, there is the requirement
that agreeable legal and scientific terminology be selected with great
On the jurisprudence of interests see Pound, Jurisprudence, (1959), and
Schoch, ed., The Jurisprudence of Interests (1948).
8 On the jurisprudence of values, see generally l\1cDougal and Feliciano, Law
and ]Jinimun~ World Public Order 302-309 (1961) ; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics
(1936) ; James, Essays in Pragmatism (1951). On values in the age of science
and technology, see Rev. Theodore l\I. Hesburgh, "Science and Technology in
l\Iodern Perspective,'' 28 Vital Speeches 631 (1962).
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discern1nent. This problen1 is particularly critical when the subject is
undergoing the critical develop1nents perceivable in the one under
consideration. Any choice of tern1s is not without attendant difficulties. For there is the need not only to signify precise concepts. There
is also the need to avoid language ""hich conveys unintended or
undesirable connotations.
It is necessary to a Yoicl the use of tern1s which might suggest or
in1ply-either in then1selves or in their probable antonynls-preordained or predeter1nined legal consequences. In particular it has been
necessary to select language '"hich seeks to avoid suggesting or
in1plying closed categories of legal uses.
In\olvement in an opposite approach n1ight induce charges that
the author ""as seeking to establish a la'v of space having all the
hypothetical fixity of a sophisticated legal code. Nothing could be
further fron1 1ny intended purpose. It .should be pointed out, perhaps, that one who e1nbarks seriously upon an analysis of the deYeloping la'v of outer space is in a particularly favored position to
ackno,-vledge the open-ended practical uses of outer space. If this be
true, as it unquestionably is, there is an obvious need that legal ternlinology-at least at the n1ost fundan1ental level of concepts and
principles-should endeavor to be no In ore close-ended than the practical matters falling under its dominion. In short, there is the need to
avoid language which 1night unconsciously close or predetermine the
range of legal uses of outer space.
This la,v, 'vhile yet in its for1native stages, should not be burdened
with unsupportable assun1ptions flow·ing fro1n unduly restrictiYe
legal terminology. This conclusion must be balanced against the fact
that acceptable legal concepts and terminology are moving forw·ard,
even now, through the well kno,Yn processes of customary and conventional internationalla ",.·
The la'v of outer space is developing by reason of man's thirst to
use his ne",. and far-reaching environ1nent. The uses demonstrate the
breadth of his vision, imagination, and courage. 9 It is clear that the
terminology selected 'Yill mold and shape la,v's concept of things
permitted and things prohibited. For these reasons it has been my
decision to employ the tern1 "reasonable" to describe the range of
legal uses of outer space.
The concept of reasonableness provides no final ans,vers to legal
problen1s confronting duly constituted decision makers. This permits
the law of outer space to proceed upon both sound practical and
norn1ative considerations.
9

See pp. 88-123 dealing with the practical uses of outer space.
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"Reasonableness" has a long and significant tradition in international law and in the municipalla ws of nations. Its strong normative
content takes into account the enumerated elements of the social colnplex. On practical, as well as theoretical grounds, it seems best
equipped to deal with and even manage the direction which mankind
expects the law of outer space to follo'v. Through reference to this
concept the decision 1naker is accorded a scope of authority broad
enough to secure fundamental needs and is not unduly inhibited by
the demands of past logic and factual uncertainty as to the future.
Since historically it has provided abundant guidance to la'v when
conceived of as a growing institution in a living society, it may be
predicted that for the la "\V of outer space "reasonableness" will be an
eminently suitable guide. All significant community needs can readily be subsumed under its broad u1nbrella. Thus, the theoretical and
practical basis for the development of the law of outer space may be
asserted to depend upon the reasonable uses of that dimension.
The doctrine of reasonable use of outer space not only takes into
account the fact that la "\V depends on both logic and experience, it
also illustrates the fact that law is clear evidence of the ongoing
concession by force to reason. ~{oreover, it takes into account the fact
that law and policy are inextricably intertwined-and so far as outer
space is concerned, the interrelationship is particularly profound.
The concept avoids unpleasant antonyms. It supports the conviction
that a sound approach to this subject must eliminate the appearance
as 'Yell as the fact of seeking to preempt a closed -end area of law. It
prevents the early develop1nent of conceptual brackets-between a
fixed Scylla and Charybdis-by inhibiting any kind of a conceptual
straitjacket :for the dynamic qualities of a legal regime for outer
space.
Through the concept of reasonableness the emerging law of outer
space can obtain the benefits, so well known throughout the entire
world, derived from con1mon law processes and experience. It also
permits ready access to the wisdon1 of the civil law system and to the
common thread of reasonableness which permeates the world's other
great legal systems. Thus, through the guidance of "reasonableness"
one may take into account all of the forces of the social complex as
they are brought to bear on the rapidly evolving and potentially
significant law of outer space.

I. National and International Purposes to he Served
In a chronological sense the views expressed on the development of
an international law of space during the past decade have demon791-405--6u----2
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strated a strong fixation on the concept of soYereignty. 10 A second,
and equally significant approach to the subject of outer space focuses
on its being "devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes
* * * " 11 The foregoing language of . .t\.1nbassador Henry Cabot I.Jodge
to the Political Conunittee of the United Nations on January 14,
1957, 'vas the forerunner to subsequent resolutions adopted by the
General Asse1nbly of the 'C"nited Nations creating co1nmittees on the
"Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.~' 12
\\.,.hile it has long appeared that the speculations and recommendations of la ''yers concerning sovereign boundaries between airspace
and outer space "~ere premature, the discussions have served at least
one constructive purpose. These discussions have called attention to
the prin1ary fact that nation-states haT"e the same, if not greater,
concern for safety and security in outer space as they have in air
space and the surface and subsurface dimensions of the earth.
It probably does not Iniss the mark very far to assert that security
in one form or another is an almost innate human need. States have
as one of their 1nost fundamental functions the proT"iding of order,
or security, to their peoples. In the international arena the nationstate has as one of its principal responsibilities the offering of protection against alien or foreign activities prejudicial to its members,
as individuals, to the people as a body politic, and to the state as a
legal abstraction.
These rights have long since been aclmowledged by international
law. They are based upon the inherent right of a state to exist. From
this primary right flows the equally important inherent right of a
state to engage in reasonable action to defend itself and to achieve
See the materials collected in Space Law, A Symposium, Special Committee
on Space and Astronautics, "L'nited States Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington (1959), hereafter cited: "Space Law, A Symposium;" Legal Problem8 ot
Space Exploration, A Symposium, Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, United States Senate, Document No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., "\\1 ashington (1961), hereafter cited: "Legal Problems of Space Exploration;" So'Viet
10

Space Program8: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International

In~plications,

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 'Vashington (19G2), hereafter cited: "Soviet Space Programs;" Survey of Space Law, Select Committee on Astronautics and Space
Exploration, "L'nited States House of Representatives, Document No. 89, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., "\\"ashington (1959), hereafter cited: "Survey of Space Law."
See also the papers collected in the Proceedings of the First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Colloquia on The Law of Outer Space (1959-1963).
11 3G Department of State Bulletin 227 (1957).
1 2 See pp. 183-230 for the development of legal principles and rules on outer
f'pace in the United Nations.
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the requisite security from legally nonpermissible acts of other
states. 13
From this it "\vill be seen that there is a mutuality of interests
bet,veen people per se and people organized in political institutions
to conserve and maintain their ongoing independence and security.
'Vhere, in terms of space capabilities, there are nation-states of not
too greatly disparate potentials, there is at least a realistic opportunity for accommodation based on mutuality of interests rather than
on an expectation of unilateral destruction by one of the other.
Based on mutuality of interests, the price to pay for such an effort is
one \vhich constantly requires appraisal and assessment by national
leaders.
Barring an excessive imbalance-present or future-and the
i1nplementation of temptations facilitated thereby, today's precarious balance of terror emphasizes the necessity for a mutuality of
interests in international peace and security. For, if there is to be a
la\v of outer space it must be based upon the perception that mutuality of national interests will in fact be served. If there is no reasonable prospect for a mutuality of interests based on security needs, it
is not likely that there could be much effective space la\v. Further, it
is not likely that the mutuality of interests in peaceful uses-important though that may be-\vould overcome a void left by the nonexistence of mutuality in security.
If this be true it is clear, in the present world where nation-states
not only make demands upon international law, but also participate
in the resolving of such demands, that it behooves such states to put
forward their demands from a suitable power base. That the entire
power structure of the nation-state includes its recognition of and
conformity to principles and rules of law is sometimes overlooked. It
ill serves the authoritative decision maker in the age of spaee to over
look the role and function of law as an important part of the total
decisional involvement. Further, since the age of space is essentially
the politicized age of science and technology, it also is necessary for
those engaged in the manage1nent of the decisional process to take
full account of the comparative scientific and technological achievements and potential of the respective national groupings.
The importance of science and technology to the developn1ent of
the law of outer space should be readily understood. 14 Not only has
the tempo of the social complex been vastly accelerated; science and
13

See pp. 116-118, 168-182, 218-250, 289-331 for an analysis of the legal rights
of a state to n1aintain and enforce international peace and security and to engage
in meastues of self-defense.
uSee pp. 106-109, 319-328, 431-432 for a more detailed analysis of this point.
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technology also have enor1nously extended man's control over his
n1ultidimensional environ1nent. ~Ian's ne'' scientific and technological equipn1ent have provided hin1 ·with the occasion to extend his ego
into space. His ego and his de1nand £or international peace and security have not limited his out\vard ranging drives. As is \Yell kno,,n,
he now· seeks n1ore specific control O\yer his total environn1ent, and
1neasured in directions, this now· encompasses lateral move1nents into
the high seas and do\Yn\vard into inner space, both \\ater and land.
Specifically, in recent years, man acting through the political machinery of govern1nent has 1nade ever increasing claims to extend his
authority out,vard £ron1 his primary land base. This is true £or the
surface o£ the seas, superjacent airspace, £or the subsurface seas, £or
Inanageinent of the surface of the continental shel£, and £or effective
exploitation of areas lying belo\v the continental shel£.
It is clear that man is reaching out\v.a rd, do,Yn\\ard, and up\vard.
His capacity to exploit such areas raises substantial question as to
inclusive or exclusive uses o£ such areas. National interest approaches the n1atter o£ use variously. Thus, the United States has
opposed the existence o£ a larger "nuclear club" which presumably
\\ould enlarge national uses o£ outer space. At the san1e tin1e it has
supported de1nancls at the United Nations and elsewhere for broad
peaceful uses o£ outer space.
'I\Yo generalizations can be n1ade. First, in the context o£ national
security, the problem is principally t'\\o£old. \Vhat will be the substance of reasonable use? By \\hat means \Yill the la\\ of reasonable
use develop?
Second, in the context of the actual use o£ space as an environ1nent
£or the "~ide-ranging developn1ent of man's inherent qualities, the
problems appear to be very much the same. \Vhat will be the substance o£ reasonable use to achieve the blossoming o£ 1nan's capabilities? By w·hat practical1neans will the la\v o£ reasonable use develop?
'l]le interaction o£ these t\\O forces, namely, security and utilityone restrictive and £rom a political point o£ view largely cautionary
in its orientation-and the other motivated by an a\vareness o£ affirmative opportunities, and hence designed to achieve the very broadest peaceful uses o£ outer space-provides the essential dilemma
confronting the develop1nent o£ space la '"'· This condition has contributed at present to the development of the la\v along extremely practical, i£ some\vhat limited, lines.
Broad analogies to the international la \V o£ the sea and to the
international law of airspace-each being quite opposite the otherhave received some acceptance by those concerned with the formulation o£ the international la\v o£ outer space. This has resulted £rom
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serious efforts to use certain insights and practices derived from
these areas in formulating the principles and rules of outer space.
This has been based on the fact that the current regimes of the sea
and the airspace serve fairly well both national and international
purposes. Thus, to the extent that comparable or approximately similar conditions seem to exist for outer space, it is but reasonable to
expect that earlier practical experience-wherever it may be observed-will be incorporated to some extent into the practice and
usage of outer space. 'rhis incorporation is preliminary to but directive of the path of space law.
Presently the international law of the sea and the international
law of airspace contribute to co1nmon national interests in security.
Thus, it is generally agreed that both customary and conventional
international law accords to a subjacent state full sovereign rights in
its superjacent airspace. This includes the right to exclude aircraft
and other vehicles from such space. This is true even though there is
no precise understanding as to the ultimate boundary of the airspace.
The clear right to exclude, when coupled with adequate policy and
pO\Yer, conserves the security of the subjacent state.
On the other hand, the la \V of the sea conte1nplates two major
zones, namely, territorial "'~aters over 'vhich the state exercises full
sovereign rights, and, the high seas. Sovereignty over territorial
'Yaters includes the right, subject to certain qualifications, to exclude
ships and other vehicles from such space. The most notable qualification is the right of innocent maritime passage. The airspace over
territorial 'vaters is treated in the same \vay as airspace over national
land areas. Such rules, just as those applicable to land areas and superjacent airspace, confirm the security interests of nation-states in
these particular environments.
vVith the advent of modern science and technology and the miniInization of ancient li1nits on tin1e and space, states have for defensive purposes extended their historic controls-security-oriented and
of a li1nited nature-into the high seas and to the airspace superjacent to such seas. Such zonal controls may not purport to subject the
high seas to the sovereignty of any state, and pursuant to Article 2
of the now operative Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958,
nation-states are assured freedo1n of navigation, freedom of fishing,
freedon1 to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to fly over
the high seas, and other freedo1ns recognized by the general principles of internationalla,v. 15
15 Franklin, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, 1959-1960,
203 (1961). Compare, Reiff, The United States and the :Preaty Law of the Sea
(1959).
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This is true for the high seas, even though the extent of boundaries
-just as in the case of the ulti1nate ranges of sovereign airspace-is
not universally agreed to. The existence of precise physical lin1itations on boundaries is not the in1portant consideration here. The
i1nportant consideration is that certain boundary limitations admittedly do exist, that such liinitations are very directly related to conceptions of security, that security is a conceptual seamless 'veb of
Inajor political and legal concern to all states, and that international
la'' purports to protect the rights of states to engage in appropriate
security Ineasures, and, in fact, international law does recognize inhe rent security rights of states. Just as in a military sense space has
been linked to airspace as "a continuous and indivisible field of
operations/' 16 so also the concept of security knows no dimensional limitations. International la"~ ackno"~ledges the right of national security in all environments. 17
. A1though Inodern space technology had its inception in the developinent of 1nilitary rockets, it is co1nn1on kno,,ledge that a vast
a1nount of space technology results in the 1nanufacture of consumer
goods beneficial to the general public. In fact one of the justifications
for the expenditure of large public funds for space technology is
that there is a spin-off of deriYatiYe consumer benefit from on-going,
publicly supported, space research and deYelop1nent.
Space technology has proYided a great variety of 1nateriel and
technique "~hich have both 1nilitary and nonmilitary applications. In
so far as it is the firm national policy of the United States not to
initiate offensive military activity, the 1nilitary applications of existing equipment must be considered to be for defensive purposes, that
is to say, for peaceful nonaggressive military and beneficial
purposes. 18 'rhe fact remains that space technology has created
equipment 'vhich lends itself to hybrid purposes.
Just as space vehicles can serve beneficial commercial and industrial purposes in such fields as 1neteorology and 'veather forecasting,
cominunications, observation, and navigation, so it is equally clear
that they have a vast 1nilitary potential. One of the proble1ns of the
la'v of outer space is to catalogue the legal uses of such vehicles in
order to provide the 1naxinnun range of benefit to mankind. In this
General Thomas D. ""hite, USAF, "Air and Space Are Indivisible," 41 A.ir
Force 40 (::\larch 1958).
11 For a more detailed analysis of the international legal aspects of this obser,·ation, see pp. 102, 113-116, 168--182, 24!>-250.
1s The thesis that the dividing line betwPen aggressive and defensive conduct
is essentially a matter of intent and conduct has been accepted here. See pp.
34--44, 5.'3, 118, 178--194, 320-3~7, infra, for a fuller discussion of this thesis.
16
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connection it is clear that experience '-vith ocean-going vessels is of
value. Here the law has been able to distinguish on the basis of function and within this category on the basis of purpose bet,veen conlmercial passenger vessels and public military vessels. The mere fact
that public military vessels may be used both for defensive, e.g., security purposes, as 'veil as aggressive purposes, has not served to eli1ninate the use of such vessels or to lead to the assertion that their
mere existence or their presence in so1ne areas constitutes a violation
of international la,v. One of the problems which is closely related to
security in outer space deals with the ability to distinguish noninilitary from military uses and to ascertain permitted physical
locations. 19
These basic facts ·were noted by President Eisenhower's Science
.A.dvisory Committee in 1958: "There is the defense objective for the
development of space technology. 'Ve 'vish to be sure that space is
not used to endanger our security. If space is to be used for
[har1nful] military purposes, '-ve n1ust be prepared to use space to
defend ourselves." 20
In sumn1ary, the new din1ension of outer space will be used for a
nu1nber of purposes, including such reasonable uses as peaceful and
scientific uses, advancement of security requirements, and for
blurred, hybrid, or hyphenated peaceful-security purposes, as opposed to aggressive n1ilitary objectives. There is the additional possibility that a state n1ight unconscionably use space for unreasonable
purposes, that is, aggressiYe military objectives. Any meaningful
legal analysis of outer space must take these factors into consideration. Further, a balancing of these alternate uses must be resolved
largely on the ground of reasonableness and subject to sanctions proportionate to practical needs.
These factors in turn n1ust be 'veighed in the context of national
goals and needs, con1munity goals and needs, and legal concepts conlmon to modern international la,v. Based on these considerations, and
others, it will be possible to put for"'"ard certain governing principles
and rules. Further, 'vith these points in mind, it will be possible to
suggest some tentative estimates as to the direction 'vhich the enlerging law of outer space " . ill most probably take.
19

See pp. 111-118, 178-181, 268-277, infra.
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Introduction to Outer Space, An Explanatory Statenwnt Prepared by the
President's Science Advisory Oo1nntittee 1 (1958). The Chairman of the Com-

mittee was Dr. James R. Killian. In prefatory remarks President Eisenhower
made a policy statement calling for nations "to promote the peaceful use of
space and to utilize the new }{nowledge obtainable from space science and
technology for the benefit of mankind."
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...t\. part of the problem is to recognize that national and community
interests may be quite relative to time and place and that frequently
their goals are consistent and interrelated. Certain national interests
1nay be stronger than other national interests. Thus, while security
or self-defense is a pri1nary national interest, there is still the question of 'vhether it 'viii be implen1ented by unilateral or collective
n1eans .....t-\.nd assu1ning that this question has been resolved, there is
still the question of the degree of force 'vhich the defending entity
'viii bring to bear on the offending entity. Usually it ''ill be found
that the degree of interest in self-defense 1nanifested by the threatened nation 'viii be related directly to the proximity of the danger
to the threatened nation. That is, an attack upon the ho1neland 1nay
be regarded as n1ore serious than an attack upon a distant possession.
Or, an attack upon a distant possession 1night be regarded as more
grieYous than an attack upon an unreliable ally. In a practical sense,
prior to the age of outer space and the ato1n, the notion of self-defense has al,,ays been strongest respecting contiguous areas, "~hich
also v;ere easier to defend.
In vie"~ of the contraction of tin1e and space the concept of self-defense is no'v a feasible nondin1ensional concept. National strategy
has thus been much influenced by n1ilitary capabilities in space. As a
result, 1nutual international interests den1and that the concepts of
space security and self-defense be equipped ''ith 1neaningful substance, including adequate safeguards against in1proper use.
Despite the doctrine of proportionality 21 ''hich has receiYed recently increasing attention in the Free "\Vorld, there are at the InoInent no clear assurances that it has been accepted by Co1nmunist
states. This fact highlights the need for alternatives to po·wer politics
approaches to international proble1ns. Alternatives exist in processes
designed to mitigate by pacific n1eans "acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace." 22 Ho,vever, until the entire 'vorld has demSecretary of State "'"ebster wrote to ~Ir. Fox on April 24, 1841, that "nothing unreasonable or excessive [must be done], since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited and kept clearly within it." II l\Ioore,
Digest of International Law, Sec. 217, at p. 412 (1909) ; compare Secretary of
Defense Robert S. l\IcXamara, w:rhe United States and ""estern Europe," 28
rUal Speeches 626-629 (1962), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain C.
Enthoven, Department of Defense Pro~s Release 2-12, Feb. 11, 1963. Jessup, A
1llodern Law of Nations 158 (1952) says: "National justifications for the lesser
uses of force have been generally couched in legal terms-self-defense, defense
of national lives and property, reprisals, retaliation-and the customary law
developed tests of the propriety of such conduct.'' Compare, Hindrnarsb, Force
1"1~ Peace (1933).
22 U.~. Charter, Arts.1(1), 2(3), 33.
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onstrated with credible evidence a ·willingness to make use of pacific third-party judgments in international disputes, it is clear that
the legal doctrines of security and self-defense as presently constituted, will have significant applicability to the law of outer space.
The concepts of self -defense and security will be strong because of
the importance of the interests being protected.
'Vhile present e1nphasis no longer considers the subject of sovereignty in outer space to be of first importance, yet the fact that this
subject received almost exclusive attention on the part of students of
the law several years ago is instructive. 23 Such discussions illustrated
an initial and important concern for national control over outer
space. Such thinking undoubtedly was based on the view that such
control would or might further national security in man's whole environnlent. Yet, while current discussions have turned from this fixation on "sovereignty," there is still a fundamental interest in protecting 1nan against inroads upon his security fron1 outer space. Thfan's
earth-bound orientation will influence and control the substance of
the law of outer space. This is true not only because of his interest in
security but it also reflects his growing belief that outer space,
through its reasonable and peaceful uses, can serve n1any of his fundamental needs.
Thus, outer space provides a re1narkable challenge to man as n1an.
It challenges 1nan as scientist. It also provides an intense and satisfying challenge to the lawyer, for it is his special task to extend concepts of justice and order throughout the totality of man's environment. Under these circun1stances it does not seem fitting that lawyers
-more by default than by overt conduct-should permit the management of these ·worthy goals to be delegated to others.
a. National and International Capabilities in Outer Space
International law as the product of man's intellect is influenced by
the forces of the social complex, including man's appraisal of power.
''Tith the advent of the atom, if not before, and in any event prior to
the space age, it was becoming clear that intellectual pre-eminenceparticularly as measured by scientific and technological achieve1nent
-was a very substantial factor in overall national strength.
23 Compare, for example, 'Velf Heinrich, Prince of Hanover, "Air La'v and
Space," 5 St. Lottis University Law Journal, 11-69 (1958) which first appeared
in Germany in 1953; John C. Cooper, "Legal Problems of Upper Space," 1956
Proceedings of the Arnerican Society of International Law, 85-94; Lipson,
Outer Space and International Law, 1-10 (1958) ; Goedhuis, "Sovereignty and
Freedom in the Air Space," 41 Transactions of The Grotius Society, 137-152
(1956).
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Leadership in science and technology has becon1e a priinary consideration in ascertaining the total power picture of national states.
In the world's present context of unstable equilibrium or balance of
terror, it is clear that "Science and technology enter into ahnost every
policy judg1nent that 1nust be made in the day-to-day conduct of
foreign affairs." 24
.A.n understanding of the outer space capabilities of nations and
groups of nations is funda1nental to an understanding of the policy
considerations affecting the substance and direction of the e1nerging
la "'" of outer space. The influence of nations is disproportionate.
Therefore, their contributions are bound to be some,vhat unequal in
the direction given to this ne\Y area of la,v. 25
By reason of the great costs and stresses involved in advanced
space research projects, only a nation rich in creative individuals,
lnunan energy, and raw n1aterials can qualify as a leader in the race
to exploit outer space. Nonetheless, the current attitude of n1ankind
is reflected in clailns for the broadest possible distribution of the
benefits deriving from the peaceful and scientific uses of outer space
--claims 'vhich have been asserted by nations ''ithout respect to
their potential in space science and technology .
.t\s a result of these de1nands, the more favorably situated states,
both on their o·wn initiative and as a result of international opinion,
have encouraged cooperative participation by all states in an effective exploitation of man~s ne,vest di1nension of his universe. The cooperation has taken the forn1 of joint national projects covering many
subjects and with benefits \videly distributed across the globe. This
has led to wide ranging private efforts, such as the International
Geophysical Year, 1957-1958, and ''ell-kno,vn private commercial
developments. The cooperation has also taken the for1n of sharing of
infonnation and 1naterials ''ith individuals and national governInents 'vhere limited space science and technological capability has
resulted in slo'v progress.
~fen of science and technology continually point to the fact that
their subject 1natter is universal, kno\YS no boundaries, and can be
dangerously repressed by efforts at artifical control. They seek a very
high degree of comn1unication in the hope that the reciprocal
sharing of information ''ill pern1it n1an to n1ore fully master the
unkno,vns of his uni yerse. Their purpose-one \Yhich stands very
Berkner, "Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy," 36 Foreign Affairs 230
(1958).
:.! :J For a description of national :--pace interests see Odishaw, ed., The Challenge.~ of Space 155-232 (1962), and December 1962 U.N. Docs. A/C.1/PV.1289
through A/C.1/PV.1298.
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high on man's scale of values-is to permit him to master his environment. Lord Hailsham, British ~Iinister of Science, has put it this
\vay: "Perhaps our most essential human characteristic is the desire
to conquer our environment by conscious and cooperative effort. In
one sense this is what science-and in another sense this is what politics-is about." 26
Illustrative of the need for a \vide cooperation, if there is to be an
effective exploitation of scientific data, is the example of \veather
forecasting. Here the entire success of a cooperative program and the
utilization of accumulated evidence depends upon the obtaining of
data from the far-flung corners of the world, the rapid communication of gathered information to a fe\v centrally situated data centers,
fast analysis, and immediate disse1nination to the ultimate consumer
-\vhether he be conversationalist, farn1er, sailor, fisherman, businessman, strategist, tourist, or another.
At the present time leadership in space science and technology
appears to be reserved to t\vo states-the United States of A1nerica
and the Soviet Union. This leadership is based essentially on their
economic wealth, since many other countries, notably in Western Europe, possess other characteristics \vhich enable them to aspire to the
rank of leadership in outer space. It is highly significant that in
June of 1962, a European Space Research Organization (E.S.R.O.)
\\as created by eleven states, and that in the preceding April, a Convention establishing a European Organization for the Develop1nent
and Construction of Space Vehicle Launchers (E.L.D.O.) had been
entered into by seven states. 27
"The Imperatives of International Cooperation," 18 Bulletin of the Atomic
(Dec. 1962). According to the American scientist, William H.
Forbes, "Scientists are already considerably more internationally minded than
most other groups and are therefore easier to make contact with, especially if
the contact is made by scientists." "The Role of Science Attaches," 13 Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 275 (Oct. 1957). "Science is the one common language
understood the world over. By exchanging scientific viewpoints and working on
common scientific problems . . . men of all nations may be drawn closer together. The endless frontiers of science, now stretching to the stars, can provide rich opportunities for 1nen to seek a common understanding of the natural
forces which all men must obey and which govern the world in which all men
must live together." Killian, Strengthening American Science, A Report of the
President's Science Advisory Committee 27-28 (1958) ; compare, George B.
Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," 42 Department of State Bulletin
278 (1960), who asserted "[S]cience is today one of the few common languages
of mankind; it can provide a basis for understanding and communication of
ideas between people that is independent of political boundaries and ideas."
27
Odisha-w, supra note 2.5, at 155. See pp. 81-84 following for detail. It was
anticipated that thirteen states would participate in this progran1. For a com26
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Additionally, as is "~ell know·n, at least France, which participates
in the t"·o foregoing programs, has sought an independent nuclear
capability in outer space. There can also be no doubt that the Chinese
People's Republic (Red China) "·ill one day make clain1s to an improYed status in the area of space science and technology.
It must be recognized that present and future scientific and technological competence "~ill affect very 1naterially the political and n1ilitary postures of nations. This in turn "·ill have the most fundamental ilnpact upon the substance of the law of outer space.
Because of the extreme ilnportance of this consideration-"..hich is
central to an analysis of this subject-it w·ill be necessary to explore
the present and probable future con1parative scientific and technological condition of the Free ''Torld "·ith that of the Soviet Union.
The scientific and technological capabilities of a nation-state or
group of allies " . ill have a direct bearing on the substance of space
la'v acceptable to then1. Thus, a state standing high in scientific and
technological capabilities would presumably benefit materially fron1
an opportunity to exploit its capabilities. A state might accomplish
this by maintaining a policy of the largest and freest use of outer
space. In a legal context this ''ould then argue for e1nphasis upon
freeclon1 of use and ''ould oppose li1nited or restricted uses. In short,
''hy should a state possessing scientific and technological proficiency
in space support a legal theory respecting the use of outer space
'vhich \vould deny or restrict its right to exploit its scientific and
technological capabilities? On the other hand, a state which does not
possess large space technology assets 1night argue for a more limited
use of outer space, thus seeking by legal and political devices to
achieve a certain negative equality. In this fashion such a state
might seek to avoid its practical shortcomings. The latter state
might, because of its practical limitations, feel that it was to its interest to make political-legal clailns 'vhereby legal limitations 'vould
be in1pressed upon scientifically and technologically more adYanced
nations.
ment on an American program in 1960 to cooperate on space activities with
.Japan, the United Kingdom, and XATO countries, see .l\Ierchant, "Importance
of the Space Program in International Relations," 42 Department of State
Bulletin 215-216 (1960). For a report setting forth national space activities and
cooperatiYe efforts by thiry-fiye countries, see U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/7 4-7G
(1962). See also nineteen "Xational Reports on Space Research Activities," 11
CO SPAR Information Bulletin 3-106 (1962) . .l\Iany cooperative programs between the United States and other countries have been initiated by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (XASA).
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(1) Free World Science and Technologyj An Appraisal
If leadership in practical space science and technology is so important to such national interests as security and the widest possible
peaceful and beneficial use of outer space, what then is the present
and expected future position of the -United States and the Free
'iVorld in the space contest? It is the judgment of experts that the
Free World is in the vanguard in the space contest, and, moreover,
that the United States is in a pre-eminent position, despite some unevenness of past perfor1nance.
The most sober judgment that can be made at this time as to the
range of space capabilities of the Free 1Vorld and its adversaries is
that neither side possesses a lead so comn1anding as to cause one side
or the other to embark upon reckless space policies. Their respective
capabilities at the present are not so disparate as to negate or destroy
the existing mutuality of interest in the employment of space vehicles for nonaggressive, i.e., peaceful and beneficial purposes. 28
Further, it now appears that no space contestant presently has, nor
can it reasonably anticipate, an absolutely preponderate lead in the
space race and that neither adversary expects an exclusive and significant breakthrough on the scientific and technological front. In
view of these conclusions it would appear that no country at the
present time-and probably in the future-could base a policy upon
a claim for a monopoly of the use of space or for unrestricted aggressive uses of space.
The evidence in support of this view must be subjected to the most
careful analysis. The United States historically has demonstrated a
keen interest in scientific and technological innovation. And it has
sought to maximize the use of its ideas and products. Thus, the prerevolutionary experiments of Benjamin Franklin and his interest in
research have left a strong imprint upon our national image. The
coming of the industrial revolution to the United States and the
pioneering efforts required to convert raw resources into consumer
goods stressed the role of the practical man. The establishment of
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Director of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, has outlined the general objectives of the U.S. space
program as follows: "(1) to study the space environment by scientific instruments of many types launched into space by sounding rockets, space probes,
earth satellites and artificial planets; (2) to begin the exploration of space and
the solar system by man himself ; ( 3) to apply space science and technology to
the development of earth satellites for peaceful purposes to promote human
welfare ; and ( 4) to apply space science and technology to military purposes
for national defense and security." The National Significance of the A -ugntented
Progrant of Space Exploration 2 (1961).
28
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universities and scientific and technological institutes 'vas unifor1nly
greeted with vast pride and approval. Their graduates "~ere
regarded as a valuable resource in the expansion and exploitation of
the national potential. As individuals they contributed largely to the
augmentation of national prestige and power. Although at first, as
practical people in a ne\v land, they 'vere frequently n1ore interested
in technological applications than in pure research, yet in later years
they became thoroughly a'vare of the ilnportance of pure science for
its o'vn purposes.
''rith the coming of the Second ''Torld ''Tar, science and technology
·were diverted fro1n their usual concern 'vith peaceful goods and services and were enlisted in the 1nilitary cause of "1'inning a just
peace. 29 The many abstract scientific problems, including those attendant to the splitting of the ato1n, and the remarkably successful
ans,vers ·which 'vere forthcoming, provided sound support for the
vie'v that America and An1ericans possessed a superior competence
in scientific and technological matters.
This conviction, which had engendered some post-war conlplacency, suffered a seYere shock with the launching of Sputnik I. This
achieve1nent,- a_c cording to Berlmer, "de1nonstrated to · Americans
·w hat they refused to believe before, that they are in a race for intellectual leadership when they hadn't realized that there was a race, or
even. that another nation had the capability to challenge their technology. In the complacency of our assun1ed technological lead, we
have confused our high standards of living and material prosperity
with intellectual stature. It is an extravagant and dangerous
mistake." 30
A balanced view of the present American position in the space
race must take into account many considerations. The science and
technology of the Soviet Union historically has not been so advanced
as that of the United States, but in recent years much progress has
been made. \Vhereas American concentration during the period follo,ving \Vorld \Var II down to Sputnik I 'vas essentially consumer
oriented, the Soviet concentration follo,ving that "1'ar was 1nore
proximately devoted to military and heavy industrial needs. During
the period since 1947, Soviet advances in certain areas, including military and space technology, have been very rapid. The Soviet capability in the area of large rockets and heavy boosters for space vehicles has exceeded that of the United States, but the latter is no'v
concentrating vast resources in this area and good progress is being
Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, 27-71 (1958).
ao Berkner, supra note 24, at 223.
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made. Overall advancen1ent in both nations is to a large extent a
matter of policy and intent, and while the Soviets have been willing to
devote ahnost exclusive attention to military technology, the United
States is seeking to allocate its resources between nonmilitary
and military needs. At the present the competition for excellence in
space is announced policy on the part of both nations, and intellectual attainment in science and technology is recognized as a primary
national objective. 31 The space race has, in fact, produced a myriad
of 'vonders never before enjoyed in man's long and turbulent history.
An appraisal of national scientific and technological capabilities is
not an easy task, if for no other reason than the vastness of the
subject. The difficulty is enlarged by reason of the fact that national
prestige and power are so intimately related to such capabilities.
Unique leads in specialized fields may contribute disproportionately
to notions of prestige and power, 'vhereas a more balanced appraisal
would suggest other perspectjves.
Thus, in. the· United States it has long been recognized that "the
strongest · scientific program is the progra~ with the greatest
breadth and. scope. It is impossible to predict from which quarter the
next scientific advance will co1ne; but we can try to make sure that
the Nation has able people at work across the 'vhole scientific
frontier." 32 This conclusion is based largely on the conviction,
broadly held among scientists, that science is "so completely, and so
unpredictably, interconnected that it is necessary that the entire
front advance as a whole; and that it is both silly and self-defeating
to attemp_t to force too deep advances on narrow segments." 33
At the outset it is to be acknowledged that the launching of a
man-made object into outer space, and particularly orbiting such a
vehicle beyond the gravitational attraction of the earth, is a major
achievement. Only nations possessing high scientific, technological,
and material resources are able to claim such accomplishments.
That both the United States and the Soviet Union possess the miniPresident Kennedy in his September 13t 1962 speech said that "no nation
which expects to be the leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in
this race for space." And, "I regard the decision last year to shift our efforts in
space from low to high gear as among the most important decisions that will be
made during my incumbency in the office of the Presidency." On ~fay 25, 1961,
President Kennedy had announced an accelerated U.S. space program.
32 Strengthening American Science, supra note 26, at 2.
33 Warren Weaver, "A Great Age for Science," in Goals for Americans, The
Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, 111 (1960). Compare,
Thomas J. "\Vatson, Jr., "Technological Change," Ibid., 193-204.
31
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capabilities to achieve such successes is a 'vell known :fact.34
So1ne doubt has been expressed, ho,vever, 'vhether a single nation
tnay be able to muster sufficient resources :for extended manned
flight, or at least, "·ithout prejudicing other legitimate national
goals.
Thus, an appraisal o:£ their respective capabilities in science and
technology must be directed not only to gross competences but also to
specialized capabilities. For purposes o:£ analysis, American scientific
and technological strengths will be discussed first.
On October 9, 1957, President Eisenhower, after offering his congratulations to Soviet scientists :for their successful orbiting o:£ a
Inan-made satellite, stated "I consider our country's satellite program well designed and properly scheduled to achieve the scientific
purposes :for which it was initiated." 35 In the intervening years there
have been many public and private appraisals o:£ relative specific
achievements o:£ U.S. and Soviet space programs.
James R. J{illian, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower :for
Science and Technology, made the :following appraisal o:£ U.S. technology on January 7, 1958: "The United States today is technologically strong and gro,ving stronger. I do not believe that 've have lost
out technological leadership nor that "\ve are predestined to lose it in
the :future-provided "\Ye increase our technological zest and audacity
and 've do not :fail to remedy our weaknesses. The launching o:£
Sputnik has given 1nany people the idea that the Russians suddenly
have complete teclmological superiority over us. This impression is
'vrong." 36
He made the :following comparison with Soviet accomplishments;
"'V.hat Sputnik has sho,vn is not that leadership has passed :from the
U.S. to the U.S.S.R. but that we must expect in the :future more
instances of Russian challenge to our scientific leadership. Sputnik
has shown that the U.S.S.R. is a very serious competitor in the technological field. She has not passed us yet, but she has a strong w·ill to
do so." 37 l-Ie su1nmarized his view·s as :follows : "I:£ we :fulfill our
n1un1

34

President Eisenhower in referring to the Soviet's successful launching of
Sputnik I said "The Soviet launching of earth satellites is an achievement of
the first importance, and the scientists who brought it about deserve full credit
and recognition." "Science in National Security," 37 Departm,ent of State Bulletin 820 (1957).
35 "Summary of Important Facts in Earth Satellite Program," 37 Departm,ent
of State Bulletin 674 (19G7).
36 Killian, "M:aintaining the Technological Strength of the United States," 38
Department of State Bulletin 187 (1958).
31 Ibid.
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potential for skill, talent, education, and quality, if we can give full
recognition in our national life to the importance of emphasizing
quality and of achieving intellectual preeminence, both for our internal benefit and our external position, there would appear to be no
real impediment to our steady technological advance." 38 His judgnlent was based on the American pattern of education, her technological facilities, and the maturing skills and freedoms of American
industry. Explicit "\vas his faith in the productive capabilities of free
and dignified individuals.
Dr. l(illian singled out for particular praise American leadership
in the fields of pure nuclear physics including its military and general industrial implications. In his view American capability in lowenergy nuclear physics was undisputed. He also credited the United
States with leadership in "high-speed calculating machines, polymer
chemistry and its applications to plastics and synthetic fibers, solidstate physics and its applications to transitors, and many other
fields." 39
His appraisal of Soviet accomplishments rated them high in highenergy nuclear physics, including the possibility of their achieving
excellence in that field, and credited them with good competence in
oceanography, rocket propulsion, theoretical mathematics, space medicine, and some fields of electronics.40
In December of 1958, Dr. Killian, as chairman of the President's
Science Advisory Committee, appraised American scientific leadership in these words: "No one should infer from this report that U.S.
science is beset with fatal flaws or deficiencies. Actually, it has a
scope and depth unequaled anywhere in the world. In less than a
generation, the U.S. has wrested scientific leadership from it birthplace, Europe, and since 1945 over half of all Nobel prizes in the
sciences have been awarded to Americans. The Federal Government
has played an important role in this achievement. But continued
leadership in science will require a more diligent and farsighted
effort on the part of Govern1nent-as the largest supporter of research-to see that its influence on U.S. science is informed and
guided by wise and coherent policies." 41
In January, 1960, Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant
appeared before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
Ibid., at 190.
Ibid., at 187.
40 Ibid.
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Strengthening American Science, supra note 26, at 3. (Italics added.)
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and appraised the United States space program. It was his view that
while the United States was "behind the Soviet Union in total outerspace achievements, a balanced a ppraisa1 indicates substantial and
significant achieve1nents on our own part * * * [0] ur program o:f
space science and its practical applications appears to be sounder and
broader than that o:f the Soviet Union. \Vhat we have done and are
continually doing in the many fields o:f modern science and technology, in addition to outer space, makes absurd any contention that
scientific and technological leadership on any broad :front has passed
to the Soviet Union." 42 Further, "Our own achievements negate any
contention that scientific and technical leadership on any broad :front
has passed to the Soviet Union." 43
To all this he added the :follo·wing caution: "It has become apparent to all that the Soviet Union is capable, where it choses to concentrate its efforts, o:f pioneering work in advanced and difficultfields o:f science and technology. It has been demonstrated that the
Soviet Union is not liinited to :following and imitating the achievements o:f \Vestern science and technology." 44
In January, 1960, Professor George B. Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to President Eisenho,ver :for Science and Technology, in commenting on the political impact o:f scientific leadership, referred to
the intermingled problems o:f prestige and scientific capabilities. He
accepted the :fact o:f special Soviet capabilities in the field o:f large
rockets. He pointed out that the United States, having first achieved
nuclear 'veapons capabilities, had thereupon designed and perfected
rocket-booster vehicles only large enough to launch the smaller and
more sophisticated pay-loads. Thus, the United States elected to
move ahead as rapidly as possible in ballistic missiles and made its
"missiles as compact as possible to deliver warheads o:f adequate
yield." 45 He also pointed out that "extra-large rockets are not
required :for our long-range missiles; hence our deficiency in outerspace payload capability does not indicate an inferior military
capability." 46
In making a general appraisal o:f U.S. and Soviet space technology, Professor l{istiakowsky observed "Our scientific studies o:f
outer space, accomplished with smaller rocket boosters, have enjoyed
42

Departrnent of State Bulletin 214 (1960).

~Ibid.,
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at217.
Ibid., at 213.

45 George B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," 42 Department of
State Bulletin 277 (1960).
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unprecedented successes. Our scientific achievements in space have·
easily matched those of the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the
greater publicity given to the Soviet technological spectaculars."~ 7
He concluded with the important view that "The striving to e1nulate
American scientific and technological -progress has become an ambitious and urgent goal for countless millions of people, including, I
might note, the Soviet Union." 48
The close interrelationship between prestige and scientific ca pabilities was also reported by President Eisenhower's Committee on Information Activities Abroad. In 1961 l\{r. l\fansfield D. Sprague,
Chairman of the Committee, stated "The United States has had, and
continues to have, over-all superiority in science and technology.
Nevertheless, since the launching of Sputnik I there has been considerable evidence of a widespread belief that Soviet capability continues to grow relative to that of the United States and that the Soviet
Union leads in certain important aspects of space technology." 49 The
large-booster capabilities of the Soviets had provided so large a pres6ge lead for them that the committee thought that it would be
hard for American prestige in the space area to be easily reestablished short of a revolutionary scientific breakthrough. It probably
'vould be more factual to say that American prestige would be improved through successes as spectacular as those enjoyed by reason of
the large-booster capabilities of the Soviets. It is the view of scientists and technologists that revolutionary scientific breakthroughs
are very rare, and when they do occur they seem to spring up almost
simultaneously in many parts of the world.
l\1ore recent observers have also given the United States a position
of leadership in science and technology. Our science has been described as being in a "flourishing state," as a "well-rounded establishment," and as of 1961 as "pre-eminent in every field." 50 As to Ameri~·
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can technology, Piel also commented "Technology is what we are
supposed to be good at. After all, our country is the most powerful
industrial nation in the \\l'orld." 51
Much credit for continuing American leadership is given to efforts
to cross-fertilize the different scientific disciplines. This has produced a synthesis, and has thereby enriched the entire range of
science and technology. However, 'vhere there has been a highly segInented approach weaknesses have been observed. There has not been,
for example, a close relationship betwn biology and physics in the
United States with the result that biophysics has not kept pace with
other fields.
v'Triting in the latter part of 1962, Robert A. l(ilmarx has endeavored to compare American and Soviet scientific and technological
strengths and 'veaknesses. He has hel¢1 that "At the present moment,
the United States is still generally ahead of the Soviet Union in both
science and technology, but not in a nu1nber of important areas. The
realities of increasing Soviet scientific and teclmological strength cannot be gainsaid." 52
There can, of course, be no absolute appraisal of ultimate strengths
in an area as broad and dynamic as this. American sources generally
assert that the United States is strong and preeminent in such basic
sciences as agriculture, biology, chemistry, physics, and medicine.
The situation for the United States is, perhaps, not so favorable in
the derived or environmental sciences, including hydrology, meteorology, seismology, and water resources. But, neither are the Soviets
particularly strong here, since excellence in these fields depends on
special facilities resulting from the use of the entire world as a laboratory.
J(ilmarx reports that the Soviets are behind the United States in
optics, photography, metallurgy, electronics, biological sciences, and
probably other areas. 53 It is clear that the contest has been joined. In
the words of Dr. Berkner "A race for intellectual preeminence is
not in itself undesirable, for it is regenerative in character; like the
intellectual challenges faced in the past it can, in the long pull, bring
only benefit to man." 54
It is clear that the Soviets, after a slow start in the fields of science
and technology, have been coming along rapidly during the postIbid., at 196.
Robert A. Kilmarx, "Soviet Competition in Science and Technology," 43
Current History 201, 205 (1962).
53 Ibid., at 203-204.
54 Berkner, supra note 24, at 231.
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World War II period. The large interest in these fields and the
tempo of their progress has reached the point where in son1e areas
they are competitive with the United States. 55
A realistic appraisal of Soviet scientific and technological achievements as related to the problems of outer space 'vas made by Under
Secretary of State Merchant in January of 1960, when he reported
"By being first to achieve success in space flight, the Soviet Union
has reaped great prestige. Continuing achievements have made this
gain an enduring one. It has become apparent to all that the Soviet
Union is capable, where it chooses to concentrate its efforts, of pioneering work in advanced and difficult fields of science and technology. It has been demonstrated that the Soviet Union is not limited
to following and imitating the achievements of Western science and
technology. Although this new and justified vie'v of Soviet capabilities is greatly to the credit of the Soviet Union, Soviet spokesmen
would like the world to draw even more far-reaching conclusions.
The Soviet Union would clearly like the world to conclude from its
successful satellites and lunar probes that the Soviet Union has
drawn abreast and even ahead of the United States in all of the
broadly related fields which contribute to or derive advantage from
such accomplishments. Further, the Soviet argument runs that these
successes portray over-all capabilities, including military strength,
and therefore that the Soviets ride the wave of the future. The spectacular character of Soviet achievements has undeniably overshado'ved the accomplishments of the United States, and it would be
dangerous to regard as insignificant the effects-of Soviet claims based
on its achievements." 56 It was his conclusion that Soviet scientific
and technological accomplishments pose a "threat" which "is neither
purely political nor short-term." Their achievements were evidence
of "strong scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities, organizational effectiveness in concentrated effort, and they reflect growing
military strength." 57
The interrelatedness of science, technology, military capabilities,
and outer space was acknowledged by Allen W. Dulles, as Director
of Central Intelligence, in a 1960 speech. He pointed out that "There
is no tendency in the intelligence community to underestimate Soviet
sophistication in any phase of the missile field or the progress they
have been making in developing their long-range missile system. I
believe that the Soviets are trying to take advantage of the publicity
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they ha.Ye achieved 'vith respect to both 1nissile and space programs
in order to n1ake the unsophisticated believe that these achievements
mean oYerall superiority in the military field. Such superiority, in
the opinion of more qualified experts than I, does not exist." 58 In
view of the stern and relentless competition of the Soviets, he counseled against American complacency.
The form of Soviet competition 'vith American scientific and technological methodology has been analyzed by Professor ICistiakowsky.
He has contended that American strength lies in "excellence spread
over a wide scientific and teclmological base. It is a feature of an
authoritarian form of society that its government can concentrate
efforts in narrow fields. If the total strength of such a society is
. substantial, as is that of the Soviet Union, then what one might term
te1nporary technological superiority can be achieved by it in selected
sections. So long as this superiority is temporary, so long as it does
not permit a vital military advantage, and so long as it is not across
a broad front, there is no need for alarm * * *. We must constantly
bear in 1nind the sound military doctrine not to accept battle on the
field of the ene1ny's choosing. Rather, we must continue to move
across the entire broad front of scientific and technological advance.
Thus, as a nation, 've will remain a 'vorld leader." 59
Thus, it 'vill be seen that Soviet scientific and technological
achieve1nents are based essentially on three factors. There is the improved status of the Soviet intellectual con1munity. There is close
coordination between Soviet policy and scientific objectives. There is
also good 1notivation and dedication on the part of the intellectual
comn1unity to achieYe excellence. It is interesting to note that the
great value of scientific and technological product to the Communists
has resulted in a high degree of independence on the part of the
intellectual community from usual political controls. 60
The close relationship between Soviet science and national policy
was recounted in 1960 by the Science Adviser to the American
Secretary of State. Dr. vVallace R. Brode pointed out that only such
science programs as furthered the ain1 of the Communist Party were
promoted in the Soviet Union. In support of his position he cited the
"Intelligence Estimating and National Security," 42 Department of State
Bulletin 415 (1960).
59 Kistiakowsky, supra note 26, at 278.
so Berkner, supra note 24, at 227. He describes this as an "extraordinary
spectacle in a totalitarian state." Equally impressive are Soviet statistics for
1963: "Fifteen academies of sciences, 4,172 Research Institutions and 524,000
Scientists-this is the physical structure of Soviet science today." "Our
Trends," 7 USSR, Illustrated JI onthly 3 (July, 1963).
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report of the Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Science in
1959, Dr. Aleksandr V. Topchiyev, as follows:
The party teaches us that when tasks have been determined, it is
necessary first of all to organize our forces in such a way as to
solve the tasks placed before us with a minimum expenditure of
resources and with maximum effectiveness. The new increase of
research works in decisive sectors of science will require a fundamental reorganization of the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.,
and its institutions. The reorganization of the Academy must
guarantee that scientific work is brought closer to the demands
of life * * * 61
In 1960 a survey was conducted by Professor Warren B. vValsh of
Syracuse University in which he consulted more than fifty American
scientists respecting the condition of Soviet science and technology. It
\)as his conclusion, which conforms to the pattern already apparent,
that the Soviets have the "ability and the capability to accomplish
any humanly possible scientific mission to which the Soviet rulers
assign high priority. 62
Specific findings reported by Dr. Walsh include the fact that the
Soviets have had a long interest in astronomical research and have a
quantitative superiority in satellite orbit analysis, but that this commitment has not existed in cosmology and theoretical seismology.
Lacking a large number of advanced computers the Soviets have not
engaged in detailed research in general astronomy and in statistical
physics. .1-\Jthough they are second in the field of mathematics, they
were in 1960, "the world leaders in the mathematical subfields of analysis, nonlinear differential equations ('the sub-field closest to applications'), the theory of control circuits, that branch of geometry
w·hich deals with complex figures, and, perhaps also in topology." 63
American leadership was observable in other fields. Thus, the Soviets "lag somewhat behind the United States in mathematical logic,
modern algebra, algebraic geometry, and geometry as a whole. The
Soviets excel in analytical number theory, but the United States
leads in other aspects of number theory." 64
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''T

..t\.cocrding to
nJsh, the Soviets possess an excellent precision instrument industry and are able to produce high quality chemical a pparatus. They have been able to engage in quality research in the
field of physical chen1istry, and particularly polymerization, kinetics,
combustion, and plastics. All have applications in the production of
1nissiles and rockets. Other areas in '" hich the Soviets rate well inelude nuclear chemistry, including applications in the area of ultrasensitive photographic emulsions; organic chemistry, including research on organo-metallic and organa-lithium compounds; physics,
including the quantum field theory, quantum electrodynamics, and
the theories of strange particles; solid-state physics, including applications in microwave spectroscopy and other n1icrowa ve techniques;
and seismology, among others. 65
In certain areas there seems to be an unevenness in quality. Thus,
again, according to Walsh, in statistical physics only a limited
amount of research is of a very high quality, as is substantially true
in acoustics and plasma physics. In high energy nuclear physics the
"range of results has run all the way from brilliant to poor * * *" 66
and in low energy nuclear physics "there have been no significant Soviet contributions * * *" 67 The Soviet interest in satellites and other
space vehicles has resulted in excellent work in hydrodynamics and
astrophysics. Thus, while there has not been much interest in general
astronomy, there has been excellent work done in those aspects of the
subject which "are of great importance to the space age-radioastronon1y, astrononomical geodesy, and astrononomical theory." 68
~fedical science has not achieved the same standing as in the United
States.
The more recent analysis of l{ilmarx bears out the same general
conclusions. He has described Soviet physics and mathematics as being "high level," and their theoretical physics, high energy nuclear
physics, low temperature physics, and theoretical aspects of solidstate physics as demonstrating "particularly outstanding
competence." 69 He has rated their astronomy and geophysics as
having achieved remarkable successes during the past decade. Their
geophysical sciences lead "the world in quantity of work done," and
their physical chemistry is "outstanding" and comparable with that
of the \Vest." 70 As to their biological sciences, it is apparent that this
Ibid., at 282-283.
Ibid., at 283.
67 Ibid., at 284.
68 Ibid.
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has been of inferior quality until recently, but that "real progress
now is being made." 71 Their on-going research on life in a sustained
space environment may have put them ahead of the United States in
this field. This again demonstrates the uneven quality of Soviet research, since their prior record in medical and biological research has
not been of the highest order.
On the basis of facts of the kind just presented, it is clear that a
sweeping judgment as to comparative excellence is not easy to make.
There seems to be a consensus of opinion that Soviet science is very
good in the higher energy realms. It is also clear that whenever concentrated efforts have been made in particular areas the product has
generally been of a very high order. It is also equally clear that both
the United States and the Soviet Union, in contemplating the future,
have endeavored to improve upon their scientific and technological
potentials. Not the least of these efforts has been in the direction of
educating more and more of the youth of the two countries to intellectual preeminence in these fields.
In making a judgment on the matter, it is also necessary to take
into account certain specializations built up in the Western World,
but not necessarily situated in the United States. Thus, the United
Kingdom is generally recognized as preeminent in the area of radioastronomy, and this strength may readily be allocated to the
West.
Certain conclusions may be reached. Although Soviet and Western
scientific and technological bases possess different historical antecedents, at the present both bases are substantial. 72 In the future there
will be many challenging and significant achievements flowing from
each area. The West is aware of the nature of the challenge which
has been offered, and since the challenge so vitally affects political
and security considerations, it is clear that no stone will be left unturned in an effort to advance more rapidly than the Soviets.
"'\Vestern planning is based on the assumption that its more even
and broader base, coupled with its more mature technological experience, will enable it to prevail. However, the appropriate manageInent of the Western effort 'vill itself be of primary significance,
since the Soviets have demonstrated, at least on a short run basis, the
n Ibid., at 204.
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practicality of concentrating on specific scientific and technological
parameters of the space race. As has been observed by one space
strategist "It would be folly to deny * * * that the allies' estimates of
the balance of power in the future are based in part upon the expectation that 'Vestern science and technology will obtain and maintain
a decisive lead over the Soviet bloc." 73
The reasons for expecting continued qualitative leadership by the
West are diverse. The commitment to freedom is a more enduring
base upon which to construct excellence than a commitment to absolutism. The economic resources of the West are more substantial tlian
those of the Soviets, and tremendous amounts of money are being
directed to,vard scientific and technological pursuits by government,
private industry, research foundations, and universities. Broad policy has been clarified, and this policy calls for victory in the space
race. The significance of this race is well understood in the United
States, and while taking into account occasional doubts respecting
the substance of U.S. policy, there is general agree1nent that the
A1nerican public supports the significance of being first in the space
race. The economic implications of the space race are generally
understood, and government spending in this area has contributed
materially to the level of employment in the United States. In the
United States, it has been proven possible to modify the direction of
productive effort rapidly, as evidenced by the birth and rapid development of the electronic industry after 1930. This illustrates not only
ingenuity in a creative sense, but it also demonstrates the ability of
the United States to excel in any complex subject to which it devotes
the requisite effort. In this connection the value of the free enterprise
system is of central importance. 74
Kilmarx suggests numerous reasons for Soviet advancement in
scientific and technological capabilities. Not the least of the Soviet
attributes is the factor of centralized control for planning, direction,
operation, and management. He points out that the Soviets have
given a "very high priority * * * [to a search] for scientific and technological breakthrough 'vith ''eapons applications * * * " 75 The
Soviet effort is not unique.
In conclusion it can be stated generally that the United States
continues to have a reasonable qualitative leadership over the Soviets
Goldsen, Outer Space and the International Scene 3 (1959).
RADl\1 J. P. :1\Ionroe, USN, "The Navy in Space," 5 Navy 9 (1962). He
points out the close connection between freedom for science and f.reedom for
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in the scientific and technological aspects of space. Certainly, it cannot be concluded that the Soviets, in any significant area of the space
race, possess a military advantage, although their larger-booster capability does constitute an exploitable prestige factor.
If this be true, then the inaugural remarks of President I\:ennedy
on January 6, 1961, are particularly pertinent. It will be recalled
that he said :
To those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we
offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the
quest for peace, before the dark po,vers of destruction unleashed
by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental selfdestruction.
Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of
its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts,
eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts
and commerce. 76
Man's important activities must be subject to law and order. Man's
use of space, either as presently understood or as his imaginative
ingenuity will in the future direct him, is destined to be for important purposes. In view of the total capabilities of the United States
and the Western World in space, and of principal importance its
generally superior scientific and technological capabilities and potential, it may be concluded that the United States would not be taking
undue risks in maintaining a policy permitting the extension of law
to space uses. 77 It must be conceded that national policies must be
based upon a foundation of power which is adequate to the enforcement of such policies. There is no evidence which would support the
view that the United States and the Western World would be unable
to enforce a policy of requiring conformity to the rule . of law in
space. The rule of law has brought untold benefits to mankind. It
would appear that the burden of proof is on those who would forestall or unduly restrict the extension of the rule of law to man's activities in space.
b. Political Approaches to the Law of Outer Space
The emerging law of outer space reflects the multiple international
and national forces of our times. It also reflects the search for a
76
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con1munity o:f interests in the use o:f space, but at the same time there
is clearly an admixture o:f motives and interests observable within
the decisional :forum. Inconsistencies within the political ranks o:f a
given nation are observable, and patently obvious is the difference o:f
attitude and approach on the part o:f scientists on the one hand and
the typical political-legal leader on the other. One o:f the most notable contrasts has been the splendid scientific cooperation in the
peaceful uses o:f outer space and the relatively puny :formal legal
accomplishments realized at the international bargaining table.
Formal public international efforts to develop a law o:f outer space
have been located principally at the United Nations. Beginning in
1958, the General Asse1nbly adopted Resolution 1348 (XIII) on the
Peaceful Uses o:f Outer Space, by a vote o:f 53 to 9, with 19 abstentions. Subsequently the General Assembly unanimously agreed on
:four resolutions all entitled "International Co-operation in the
Peaceful Uses o:f Outer Space:" on December 12, 1959; on December
20, 1961 ; on December 19, 1962; and on December 24, 1963. 78 The
United States, in the words of its Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., :from at least as early as
January 12, 1957, has supported as an objective the use o:f outer space
"exclusively * * * [:for] peaceful and scientific purposes * * * " 79
Additionally, the United States nfemorandum submitted to the First
Con11nittee o:f the General Assembly on the above date, promulgated
U.S. policy as one o:f cooperation through inspection:~ participation,
and control.
The 1958 United Nations Resolution 1348 (XIII) called :for a
report by an ad hoc committee as to the United Nations activities
and resources relating to the peaceful uses of outer space, and on
"the nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of
programs to explore outer space." 80
•s The 1959 resolution was assigned number 1472 (XVI), the 1961 resolution
was assigned number 1721 (XVI), the 1962 resolution was assigned number
1802 (XVIIL and the 1963 resolution was assigned number 1962 (XVIII), by
the General Assembly. These resolutions are set out in the Appendix as Annex
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. The legal significance of United Nations action and of
these resolutions is considered infra at pages 192-224.
1 9 Legal Problems of Space Exploration, supra note 10, Chapter I, at 990. II
Doouments on Disarmantent, 19-'15-1959, 733 (1960). See Annex 5, infra, at
4u2. On November 14, 1957, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1148
(XII) which urged that States following a disarmament agreement would engage in a joint study of an "inspection system designed to ensure that the
sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and
scientific purposes.'' See Annex 6, infra, at 455.
80
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The 1959 Resolution 1472 (XIV) .established a Committee to review, study, and report on "practical and feasible means for giving
effect to programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space which could
appropriately be taken under United Nations auspices * * * " 81
Further, it requested the Committee to "study the nature of lf~gal
problems which may arise from the exploration of outer space." 82
The 1961 Resolution 1721 (XVI) commended to States "for their
guidance in the exploration and use of outer space the following
principles: (a) International law, including the Charter of the
United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies; (b) Outer
space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all
States in conformity with international law and are not subject to
national appropriation." 83 The Resolution also invited the Committee to "study and report on the legal problems which may arise from
the exploration and use of outer space." 84
The 1962 Resolution 1802 (XVII) asserted the belief "that the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space should be
carried out in conformity with international law including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of friendly relations
among nations." 85 It called for legal progress in a number of specific
and important areas.
The 1963 Resolution 1962 (XVIII) adopted the views contained in
the foregoing resolutions. Its importance must be measured not only
by its acceptance of general principles but also by significant provisions relating to the operational aspects of space vehicles. 86
It is interesting to note that the theme of "peaceful uses" runs
through all of the foregoing resolutions. Thus, the 1958 Resolution
recognized "the common interest of mankind in outer space and that
it is the common aim that it should be used for pe~eful purposes
only." The 1959 Resolution recognized "the common interest of mankind as a whole in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space." The
1961 Resolution extended "the common interest of mankind in furthering the peaceful uses of outer space," by recognizing the further
"urgent need to strengthen international cooperation in this important field." The 1962 Resolution served the same purpose by recalling
the 1961 position favoring "international co-operation in the peace81
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ful uses of outer space." The 1963 Resolution maintained continuity
with the past by "recognizing the common interest of all mankind in
the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes."
The position of the United States throughout this period has been
one of actiYe general support of the above resolutions. At the same
time that the United States has sought clarification of general legal
principles applicable to space, it has also advanced a draft proposal
"On Assistance to and Return of Space Vehicles and Personnel," 87 a
draft proposal "On Liability for Space Vehicle Accidents," 88 and a
draft "Declaration of Principles Relating to the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space." 89
The top officers of the executiYe department of the Government
have, during the administrations of President Eisenhower and President 1\:ennedy, given complete support to the propositions that la'v
'vas applicable to space, that space should be used for peaceful purposes, and that there was a need to be selective in the application of
legal principles and rules to outer space. The general resolutions supported at the United Nations by the United States illustrate the
broad and substantiYe approach to peaceful legal uses. The Declaration of Principies noted above, and put forward on December 8,
1962, identifies broad principles having appeal to the United States.
At the same time that the United States has advocated the selection
of broad principles, it has also assigned high priorities to proposed
specific rules, as reflected in its drafts for assistance and return, and
on liability.
The general approach of the United States may be illustrated by
representative statements on the part of its President and persons
holding the highest posts in the Departments of State and Defense.
Thus, early in January of 1958, President Eisenho,ver 'vrote to Premier Bulganin proposing that "we agree that outer space should be
used only for peaceful purposes." 90 Later in 1958, the Legal Adviser
to the Department of State pointed to the importance of insuring
that outer space be used for peaceful purposes only, and indicated
that this inYolYed defense and foreign policy considerations of the
utmost importance. 91 Then, in September, 1958, Ambassador Lodge,
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in seeking the inclusion of international cooperation in the field of
outer space in the agenda of the thirteenth General Assembly, filed a
memorandum calling for support of "the principle of the peaceful
utilization of outer space * * * " 92 This was followed by an address
to the General Assembly by Secretary of State Dulles on September
18, 1958, in which he proposed a draft resolution for Assembly action in which he indicated that the "United States believes that the
United Nations should take immediate steps to prepare for a fruitful
program on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space." 93 Thus, during 1958, admitting that policy considerations
were productive of problems respecting outer space, the United
States official position supported peaceful uses, utilization for "constructive pursuits," and an employment dedicated to the "maximum
benefit to humanity." 94 The avenue whereby such goals were to be
achieved was international cooperation. 95
From 1958 on, with the growing appreciation of the substantial
benefits to mankind which could be realized through the broadest
possible uses of space, the official policy of the United States continued to support the principle of peaceful uses. Thus, on May 6, 1959,
Ambassador Lodge in appearing before the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space stated that it was
his country's task "to help chart for the United Nations a course of
cooperation among nations in the use of outer space for peace." 96
92 General Assembly Official Records: Thirteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda
Item 60, 4 (1958). See Annex 11 at p. 460. This proposal was explained by

Ambassador Lodge in a speech to the American Legion on September 2, 1958,
where he stated: "Specifically, the United States will propose a program for
international cooperation in the field of space. A practical program for international cooperation in the scientific and peaceful study and exploration of outer
space must be set up." Through such an effort it was to be hoped that the
United States would "increase the prospects that outer space will not be used
for [aggressive] military purposes." 39 Department of State Bulletin 451
(1958).
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The situation during 1960 was well summarized by Under-Secretary o£ State ~Ierchant in testimony before the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics. He said:
Even before the launching o£ the first earth satellite, the President invited the Soviet Governn1ent to join in an effort to find
''ays to assure that outer space be used for peaceful purposes
only. Ambassador Lodge has reiterated this proposal on appropriate occasions in the United Nations. The United States has
thus made clear its desire, either as a part o£ or separately from
the more inclusive efforts to establish control o£ armaments, to
study and explore together with the Soviet Union and other nations 'vhat 1night be done to accomplish this objective.
~feanwhile we have sought to proceed with more immediately
attainable consultative and cooperative activities related to the
peaceful uses themselves. In doing so, we have recognized that
outer space, by its very nature, is not the concern o£ one nation
oro£ only a few. It is o£ interest to all. 97
The continuing policy o£ the United States was described by President l{ennedy in his address to the United Nations on September
25, 1961. In recognizing the need for the application o£ law to man's
activities in outer space, he called for the implementation through the
United Nations o£ a £our-point program. American policy, to be carried out through the United Nations, was to consist o£ "extending
the United Nations Charter to the limits o£ man's exploration in the
Universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting ·weapons o£ mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening
the mysteries and benefits o£ space to every nation." 98 In addition to
these four basic principles the President also acknowledged the need
for international cooperation in certain specific areas, e.g., weather
prediction and control, and a global communications system.
During 1961 and 1962, practical efforts were made by the United
States to implement the four major proposals o£ President Kennedy,
as well as the two supplementary ones. Thus, in addressing Committee I at the United Nations on December 4, 1961, Ambassador Adlai
E. Stevenson urged international space cooperation for the benefit o£
mankind. His £our-point program closely paralleled that put forward by the President. He advocated a "regime o£ law and order in
outer space," "the open and orderly conduct o£ outer space activities," "a worldwide effort under the auspices o£ the United Nations
n l\ferchant, op. cit., supra note 42, at 214.
98 44 Department of State Bulletin 622 (1961).
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in weather research and weather prediction," and "the establishment
of a global system of communication satellites." 99 Although no direct
reference was made to the President's policy of "reserving outer
space for peaceful use," yet all of the points put forward may be
subsumed under this general heading.
.A somewhat different restatement of the President's four-point
program was suggested by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy .Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization .Affairs, on March
10, 1962. According to him, the program "called for a regi1ne of law
and order in outer space, the registration of satellites and space
probes [which had been considered by .Ambassador Stevenson as a
subsidiary point to his 'open and orderly conduct of outer space
activities'] 100 with the United Nations, a worldwide program
o£ weather research and vveather forecasting, and international cooperation in the establishment of a global system of communications
satellites." 101
The fact that American policy toward outer space was undergoing
a modest reappraisal was illustrated by Secretary of State Rusk's
emphasis in a speech entitled "New Frontiers of Science, Space, and
Foreign Policy," delivered on l\iay 25, 1962. He advanced six goals,
as follows:
"First. We think that outer space should be free for use by all
nations as long as the use is consistent with the principles of the
United Nations Charter.
Second. We think that the regime of law obtaining among the
nations on earth must be extended and improved as it pertains
to outer space.
Third. vVe think that there must be devised a clear and recognized means for the identification of rights and the adjudication
of disputes as between nations conducting activities in outer
space. We require, for example, mechanisms to assist in the rescue of astronauts who land unexpectedly in foreign territory
and for the determination of liability for injuries or damage
caused by objects returning from outer space.
Fourth. We think that useful applications of space technology, such as communication and meteorological satellites,
should be available to all nations, particularly the less developed
99
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nations, commensurate with a realistic assessment of their needs
and their ability to commit resources to the use of these applications.
Fifth. We stand for the proposition that opportunities to participate in outer space activities should be open to all nations
commensurate with their ability and willingness to cooperate
constructively.
Sixth. We have proposed, as part of our disarmament proposals no'v being discussed at Geneva, that, under adequate inspection and control, the placing in orbit of \vea pons of mass destruction be prohibited.'' 102
Testimony before subcommittees of the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics in 1962, illustrated specific areas in \vhich
cooperation for peaceful purposes might be implemented. On September 11, 1962, Mr. Gardner emphasized the use of meteorological
satellites for cooperative programs in the peaceful use of outer space.
He said "Here is a program in the peaceful uses of outer space which
is not only important to us nationally, for economic and social reasons, but in addition is recognized as vitally important to the daily
needs of people in all countries." 103
~fr. G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, foresaw similar national and international gains
through the development of communications satellites. It was his
view that the exploitation of outer space for peaceful purposes in the
field of communications would be furthered by a truly global system
based on international cooperative programs. 104
The position of the United States at the close of 1962 was clearly
stated before the First Committee of the United Nations by Senator
Albert Gore on December 3. After noting that the United States
through the United Nations had cooperated in the goal "that man's
conduct in outer space will be reasonably orderly, certainly peaceful,
and in the best interests of all nations and all peoples * * * ",105 he
asserted that there was an ongoing requirement for the "constructing
of adequate assurances that the exploration and use of outer space
\Vill be for peaceful purposes. My government wishes its views on the
46 Department of State Bulletin 933 (1962).
47 Ibid., 500 (1962).
104 Ibid., at 570.
105 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1289 8-10 (1962). A similar viewpoint was expressed
by the American Representative at the l\larch 19, 1962 meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. l\lr. Plimpton called for "international
cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space in the fateful years that are
ahead of us." U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/PV.2 26 (1962).
102
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most pressing aspects of this problem explicitly stated and understood. It is the view of the United States that outer space should be
used only for peaceful-that is, non-aggressive and beneficial-purposes. The question of military activities in space cannot be divorced
from the question of military activities on earth." 106 Throughout the
space age, then, it will be seen that the United States has asserted
policies built on peaceful uses and international cooperation. Underlying these considerations have been the expectation that wide
and mutual benefits would result.
The views put forward by or on behalf of the executive department of the government have also been proclaimed in the Congress.
Thus, in June, 1958, Congressman John W. McCormack of Massachusetts introduced House Concurrent Resolution 332, which expressed "the devout wish o£ all peoples everywhere, in every nation,
in every environment that the exploration of outer space shall be by
peaceful means and shall be dedicated to peaceful purposes." 107 The
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, adopted on July 29,
1958, took this viewpoint into account in detailing the following objective as being one of those pertinent to the Act:
( 4) The establishment of long-range studies of the potential
benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes** * 108
The Act made it clear that there was no inconsistency between the
goal of peaceful and scientific uses of outer space and the national
requirement for national security. Thus, the Act made reference to
the role of the Department of Defense in dealing with activities "peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons
systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective
provision for the defense of the United States) * * *" 109 It was under
these circumstances that the Act announced the policy of the United
States to be in support of devoting outer space activities to peaceful
purposes beneficial to all mankind.
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Ibid., at 13. Compare, Gardner, "Cooperation in Outer Space,'' 41 Foreign
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One of the legal dra:fts1nen o:f the statute has stated that the word
"peaceful" in the Act, "n1eans nonaggressive rather than
'nonmilitary.'" 110 He added that this interpretation of the language
expressed the intent of the Congress, and stated "The same meaning
of the tern1 may be found in international law. It also appears to be
the most reasonable interpretation. If 'peaceful' is understood to
mean 'nonaggressive,' * * * the legal control of outer space will be
greatly facilitated." 111
It is worth noting that the American Bar Association's Committee
on the Law of Outer Space, 1959, accepted the same viewpoint. The
report provided :
In the sense of the [United Nations] Charter, and in international law generally, [the term 'peaceful'] * * * is e1nployed in
contradistinction to 'aggressive.' * * * Thus any use of space
\vhich did not itself constitute an attack upon, or threat against,
the territorial integrity and independence of another State
\Yould be permissible * * * 112
Both of these points have been noted by Spencer M. Beresford, Special Counsel, House Committee on Science and . .L\..strona utics, from
1958 through 1960. In ackno\vledging the hybrid military-peaceful
potentialities of almost all spacecraft, he stated that "As a practical
matter, the range of activities in outer space will be narrow indeed i:f
all that lend themselves to military purposes are prohibited." 113 To
require the concept of peaceful uses to include only those uses exclusively dedicated or potentially so dedicated to nonmilitary purposes
would so gravely restrict the practical uses of outer space as to deny
mankind the many benefits now open to him.
The same conclusion has been reached by a commentator having an
official connection with the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

° Feldman, "The Report of the United Nations Legal Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: A Provisional Appraisal," Second Colloquium,
supra note 10, at 23.
111 Ibid. He offered as a tentative definition of aggressive space vehicles and
activities "those that can cause direct harm to objects on the earth's surface."
As previously indicated, aggression is characterized by intent and conduct
reflecting ~uch intent.
112 Report of the 001n-mittce on the Law of Outer Space, American Bar Association 11 ( 1959). For the ABA's view that aggressive conduct must be distinguished from self-defense and security rights, see the 1959 resolutions adopted by the House of Delegates. 84 Annual Report of the A1ncrican Bar Association 175-176 (1959) ; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, supra note 10, at
595-596.
113 "Surveillance Aircraft and Satellites: A Problem of International Law," 27
The Journal of .Air Law and Commerce 109 (1960).
11
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In pointing to the duality of purpose served by the 1958 statute, Dr.
Edward C. elsh has emphasized the fact that the policy language
of the Act ("activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind") "does not mean that space has
no military or defense uses." 114 Thus, he made the point that "N othing is more essential for peace than the capability to discourage or
deter attack. In my view, 've do not have a division between peaceful
and nonpeaceful objectives for space. Rather, we have space missions
to help keep the peace, and space missions to help increase our ability
to live well in peace." 115
Nevertheless, there are strong pressures against the sending into
outer space of the mass destruction type weapon. Reference has been
made above to President l(ennedy's 1961 address to the United N ations in which he asserted, as one of America's major policies for
space, that weapons of mass destruction be prohibited in space or on
celestial bodies. Other U.S. officials have enunciated this view on several occasions. The substantial efforts made by the United States to
prevent the placing of weapons of mass destruction into orbit during
the first stage of the disarmament process are well known. The policy
of the United States was restated by Senator Gore at the United
Nations in December of 1962: "Even though it is now feasible, the
United States has no intention of placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit unless compelled to do so by actions of the Soviet
Union." 116 Thus, it is clear that whether or not outer space will be
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"Peaceful Purposes: Some Realistic Definitions," 44 Air Force &; Space
Digest 73 (1961). The Secretary of Defense in reporting on U.S. military space
programs has indicated that "The exploitation of outer space as a possible
environment for basic defense missions is receiving increased attention and
activities in this field are steadily expanding." Annual Report for Fiscal Year,
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"Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space," they
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reserved exclusively for peaceful and scientific uses has not been ultiJnately resolved. "\Vhile it is generally recognized that space vehicles
do possess hybrid characteristics, that is, they may be used either for
peaceful and scientific purposes or they may be used for aggressive
military purposes, this fact alone does not prevent the use of such
devices. Further, the military use of such vehicles, when reasonably
used for good or proper purposes, e.g., self-defense or security, is not
inhibited. It is only when such devices are employed for aggressive
purposes, including as weapons of mass destruction, that United
States policy and much of mankind has come to regard them as objectionable. It is now coming to be understood that space vehicles are
subject to international law and to the terms of the United Nations
Charter.
c. Policy Approaahes in the United States to a Law of Outer

Space
American policy respecting outer space, despite the general a wareness of the facts sets forth above, has been divided bet,veen t'vo
opposing schools of thought. The disagreement is not as to goals so
much as it is a question of how American interests might be best
advanced and protected.
Wben a subject is regarded as novel there is an almost relentless
tendency to advocate caution in treating it. When the subject is
better understood there is a noticeable tendency to move more rapidly to resolve remaining uncertainties. Several years ago the counsels of caution were preponderate, and the "wait and see" point of
vie'v seemed to prevail. However, with greater experience a new
and complete disarmament, seeking to promote the peaceful use of outer space
during stage I, provided "The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of
weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited." U.N. Doc.
A/4891, 45 Department of State Bulletin 652 ( 1961). It is also noteworthy that
during the height of the Cuban crisis in 1962, President Kennedy wrote to
Premier Khrushchev, "I think we should give priority to questions relating to
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the
great effort for a nuclear test ban." New York Tintes, October 29, 1962. See also
Kennedy, "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Step Toward Peace," 49 Department of State Bulletin 234 (1963). The treaty text is set forth at pp. 239-240.
The foregoing attitudes culminated on October 17, 1963, in General Assembly
Resolution 1884 (XVIII). This Resolution entitled "Question of general and
complete disarmament," after calling attention to the previously asserted belief
that "the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment
of mankind" solemnly called upon all states to refrain from placing weapons of
mass destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies. U.N. Doc. A/RES/1884
(XVIII). See Annex 13 at p. 462.
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approach is gaining acceptance. This view was portrayed by Senator
Gore at the United Nations in 1962. He said:
Outer space is not a new subject; it is just a new place in
which all the old subjects come up. The things that go on in
space are intimately related to the things that go on here on
earth. It would be naive to suppose that we can insulate outer
space from other aspects of human existence. 117
One commentator observed in 1960, that perhaps the State Department's position of "wait and see" may have "already served its full
useful period." 118 Recently a high Department of State official has
called for international "cooperative arrangements on specific functional problems," but not for an outer space "Congress of Vienna." 119
It is noteworthy that the debates at the United Nations have disclosed several opposing points of view as to the means whereby the
law of outer space might best develop. Thus, there are numerous
proponents of the view that the United Nations should prepare, in
addition to those already agreed to, a rather extensive statement of
legal principles for outer space. Some nations have advocated the
preparation of a detailed draft convention, which would contain all
the specific rules characteristic of a prolix code. Other points of
view, including that of the United States, call for agreement on an
effective number of basic principles, subject to additional agreement
on a restricted number of detailed rules which reflect the practical
needs of the current space age. This would leave to the future additional detailed rules and would make them depend on a realistic demand for their existence. 120
The supreme danger confronting legal policy-makers is that an
effort dedicated to providing answers may sometimes result in overly
sin1ple answers to complex and difficult problems. A further danger,
in the eyes of some, is the effort to provide answers at all, on the
score that there are not ultimate solutions and that the attempt to
provide answers which are not real is both retrogressive and misleading to the naive and unsuspecting.
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The reluctance of policy-makers to provide real answers to serious
legal questions is, in part, understandable. Such makers of policy are
n1anagers of policy, and if their answers are too sharp and precise,
they of course may, in an operational situation and in a logical sense,
be i1npaled upon their prior rationale. It is always more difficult to
explain a way a previously given answer than to be able to manage
affairs absent such self-imposed limitations. Admittedly, the existence of present answers restricts the freedom of action of the policymanager, if it could be assumed that constant i1nprovisation is a satisfactory alternative means of proceeding.
\Vith the emergence of an international la 'v of outer space, the
American-as well as his foreign counterpart-is confronted by just
these problems. There is, in this connection, an additional point to be
noted. No answer-whether improvised or based on the most careful
study and analysis-can hope to be ultimate. In particular, answers
to social and hence political and legal matters must take into account
the actual conditions of life in w·hich they must be used. Hence, an
unwillingness to provide answers on the score that they will not be
definitive would hardly seem to be a reason for not seeking answers
appropriate to a given time and place.
Such an approach need not suggest that the time has arrived for
the preparation of a comprehensive code on the la'v of outer space.
But, on the other hand, it does not suggest that the correct approach
is to await the existence of hard, practical problems before attention
is given to resolving them. In short, the case by case method~om
mon law approach-has no greater intrinsic claim to being the sole
or best approach than the serious and practical preparation of a
comprehensive code. Experience has demonstrated that the creation
of law in the civil law countries is accomplished as effectively as in
those countries following the common law tradition.
The principal reason for a "wait and see" approach put forward
by commentators, who have interested themselves in the emerging
law of outer space, has been that all of the essential facts-particularly scientific facts-have not been made available. It should be
noted, ho·wever, that during the past ten years a more complete understanding of space capabilities has been achieved.
Other more activistically inclined commentators have argued that
outer space law is more a political than a scientific problem, and that
its principles and rules "like much else in an indeterminate universe,
depend on the order of experience in space as well as on the changing political context." 121 ~fany commentators have remarked about
McDougal and Lipson, "Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space," 52 A.J.I.L.
430 (1958).
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the extensive gap between scientific and technological achievement
and the condition of the law .12·2 They favor closing the gap through
the promulgation of what they regard as present, practical, common
sense rules. Further, they admit the existence of binding principles
and rules. Rather than accepting the policy of deferring to science
and technology, and since the day-to-day operation of public affairs
under given rules and principles is infrequently their concern, the
proponents of this point of view favor a present affirmative role on
the part of lawyers and political leaders in the formulation of the
law.
Arguments for present action take several forms and have been
voiced by theoreticians and practitioners alike. The principal reason
advanced is that the creation of an adequate law for outer space is
no longer in the area of theory "but a practical necessity." 123 The
Secretary of State has seen in an emerging law of outer space a new
challenge to "man's ability to organize his affairs with at least a
modicum of good sense." 124 Some have noted that law does not appear to be keeping pace with scientific advances, and that there is a
need for law to provide a peaceful setting for science, both at home
and in the world at large.
Those who support the need for a present law of outer space fear
the consequences of uncontrolled and haphazard expedients. This position was best put by Senator Kenneth B. Keating, who, in 1958,
after expressing disapproval of the "wait and see" approach, urged:
World civilization has passed the point-again due to a rising
Tempo in human affairs-where it can afford to sashay into
Space without some anticipation of the consequences or permit
the concept of Space regulation to 'just grow.' 125
Others deplore the social waste and resultant friction involved in
taking corrective action after having harvested the fruitless results
produced by earlier unconcern. This role of decision making in reverse has been described as involving five phases. At first, there is an
effort to avoid giving any thought to the future, particularly if internationally difficult problems seem to be involved. Then, other nations with other interests move into the political vacuum and posit
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affirmative policy attitudes, 'vhich 1nay be, and often are, opposed to
the interests of the slothful state. Then, there is sharp a 'vakening on
the part of the dormant, would-be, policy-maker. This is followed by
substantial efforts to overcome past inactivity and to modify or set
aside the results of earlier procrastination. Finally, this is followed
by even larger efforts, w·ith incumbent international friction, and
with no positive assurance that more might be gained than 'vould
have been 'vith an earlier mature and alert attitude. On the basis of
this k--ind of analysis, the proponents of an adequate present law for
outer space point out that goals cannot be "pondered or debated or
deliberated endlessly * * * \Ve can spend a lifetime pointing out the
administrative complexities and problems involved. But while the
problen1s are being debated, the opportunities may well be lost." 126
A long time member of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Congressman Overton Brooks, has summarized the present need for the establishment of general space la,v. He stated in
1961 "I believe "\ve must proceed at once to develop the principles of
space la'v and try to reach an early agreement on the scientific and
commercial uses of space." 127 Subjects requiring immediate legal attention, according to Mr. Brooks, included traffic control, liability
for damage, allocation of radio frequencies, and the prevention of
interplanetary contamination, among others. l\fany of the same
problems were noted by the American Bar Association in 1959, "~hen
it was calling for action in this field. 128
The present 'vriter is of the view that the cautious counsels of
"wait and see" served a constructive purpose for their time. 1'29 However, in vie·w of the present tempo of demands for a clarification
of the law of outer space, it now is clear that affirmative steps will
have to be taken to formalize the law of outer space.
It should be emphasized that lawyers should not be unduly impressed with the physical novelty of outer space. While it is a new
dimension for man's activities, there seems to be little doubt that man
will conduct himself in space very much as he has on earth. The
same values and the same problems will confront him. The law will
be man-oriented. Any proper understanding of the law of outer space
'Vatson, supra note 33, at 204.
Brooks in Ramo, ed., Peacetime Uses of Outer Space 208 (1961).
12 8 "Report of the Committee on Law of Outer Space-Recommendations:
1959," 1959 Proceedings on the Section of International and Comparative Law
215-233. This bas been reproduced in Legal Problems of Space Exploration,
supra note 10, at 571-594. Compare, Bloomfield, ed., Outer Space 150 (1962).
12 9 These have been collected by Simeone, "Space-a Legal Vacuum,'' },fiUtary
Law Review, April1962, note 5, at p. 44.
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must take into account n1an's needs and his prospective uses of outer
space. He will continue to de1nand that space be available to him for
all reasonable uses.
Thus, this book will have served one purpose if it helps move forward man's thinking on the law of outer space. The demand for
something better than presently exists is a central fact. Just as the
first book on the law of contracts has little semblance to today's publications on that subject, and just as today's interpretations of the
law of contract may prove less than adequate for generations several
tin1es removed, so presumably it will be with this space law treatise.
In fact, there is a good probability that there will be major differences between this analysis and other studies currently being undertaken.
That those of us who have been concerned with the emerging law
of outer space should vie"'" its processes and substance somewhat differently is to be expected. For, as has been suggested, the policy
considerations of this law are of more than usual importance.
Through the ongoing competition in the market place of ideas, the
views put forward here will confront other and differing views. The
ultimate synthesis-dynamic though it will be-will be instructive to
those who understand the processes and purposes of the law and to
those, in particular, 'vho w·ill be called upon to apply and enlarge it.
The future space lawyer will be involved in a fascinating process.
He 'vill move as rapidly as he can-although more slowly than many
will wish-and will give due attention to the following resources. He
""ill examine custom and its influences. He will endeavor to select
legal principles which affect his problem. He will seek meaningful
international recommendations and declarations which promulgate
such principles. He will be delighted with limited international
agreements, and even more pleased with more general agreements.
He will pursue the final objective of universal international agreements. During all of this time, he will seek to bring principles down
to rules, and rules down to enforceable rules. In brief, he will seek
the development of enough legal order in outer space to allow for the
realization of his ongoing needs.
B. THE ESSENTIALS OF A MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER

H. G. Wells wrote, somewhat prophetically, in 1895, "we have
learned now that we cannot regard this planet as being fenced in and
a se·cure abiding-place for man; we can never anticipate the unseen
good or evil that may come upon us suddenly out of space." 130
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A minimum public order in world affairs requires an awareness of
the existence of man's wide-ranging common interests. It demands
the presence of political institutions equipped to provide a forum for
discussions. This must necessarily be supplemented by forms of law
and traditions of order. Forms of coercion must be available, and
they must be not excessive to the needs of the society. A predictive
tendency to rationality on the part of participants is highly desirable. All of these factors are bound together with the conviction
that man does have a purpose in his being, and that this can be
established by the universality of his needs. 131
The public order takes appreciable form 'vith the evolution of
permitted and prohibited forms of conduct. It takes into account the
importance of the Hohfeldian arrangement of correlatives and opposites. It thus seeks to contribute to the amelioration of friction and to
the harmonization-or at least neutralization-of competing interests.
The world public order, in comparison with national public orders,
is decentralized, relatively primitive, and much in need of development. Because of the relative ineffectiveness in some circumstances of
the world public order, legitimate self-help and wrongful resort to
unpermitted forms of coercion are more typical than within a national public order. But, by reason of the destructive capabilities of
today's coercive forms, and the possibility of over-all loss rather
than net gain as a result of their successful employment, the importance of the international legal-political forum now attracts greater
significance.
Justice William 0. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court
has urged the development of a minimum of world order. He has
written:
~ir. Justice Holmes said in 1895, 'Now, at ]east, and perhaps
as long as man dwells upon the globe, his destiny is battle, and
he has to take his chances with war.' This viewpoint has dominated men's thinking for centuries. Yet it deserves no enduring
place in any decalogue. For man is capable of great cooperative
efforts in peace as well as war. Love and the instinct for preservation of life-these are even deeper in man's character than
violence. 132
This was made explicit by two authors who recently have pointed up
the fact of common individual and national interests, both long and
short term, in the establishment and continuation of a minimum
131
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world public order. After pointing out that "prohibition is the first
indispensable law of any public order," they state that this requires
that internationally "no change shall be effected through intense coercion and violence." 138
Several factors have contributed to a greater awareness of the need
for practical processes and adequate rules of substantive behavior to
avoid the alternative of violence. Within the social complex, as is
equally true in nature, there are two basic forces-one positive and
one negative. It is the function of the international lawyer to harness
these two forces in such a fashion that men everywhere will come to
recognize a mutuality of interests in deriving the maximum benefit
from these forces. Corbett has stated the problem in these words:
"The recognition and implementation of common values are the
foundation and the business of society." 134
The negative force contributing to the mutuality of interests which
demands a world public order is that of fear. The positive force is
the product of many confidences stemming from a growing realization
of mutual advantages which have derived from ever greater interdependency.
Julius Stone has called attention to the constructive force of fear
by referring to man's modern quest for survival. Personal insecurities and anxieties may be attenuated through the establishment of a
regime of law and order between peoples. 135 There can be no doubt
that common fears of mass extermination lend much support to demands for a minimum world public order.
One can also build constructively upon an understanding of the
kind of world in which we actually live. The scientific and technological revolution, as has been suggested, has triggered another revolution-the revolution of rising human expectations. The "have nots"
have been made aware of human capabilities and of their prospects
-often quite remote-of living like others live. The "haves" are in
search of consumers to buy their products. The demands of trade and
commerce have heightened contacts all around the globe. There have
been demands for interchanges of goods, services, concepts, knowhow, and-above all-ideas. With this there has been a demand for
law and order so that the benefits of this decade's great material
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progress might be widely shared. Concurrently, there has been an
expansion of a humanistically oriented philosophy, which urges that
the "good life" is within the range of all.
In addition to material considerations are the moral ones, which are
generally regarded as "essential to the vitality of all legal
obligations." 136 Stone also emphasizes the view that "the essence of the rule of law ideal lies, therefore, not in technical law as
such, but rather in the supremacy of certain ethical convictions, certain rules of decency prevalent in the community, and in the psychological fact that those who are at the apex of power share those
convictions and feel bound to conform to them." 137 These, and other
elements of the social complex, have an indelible effect on the law of
outer space.
In summary, then, a worth-while approach to the international law
of space depends upon the answer given to the question: What kind
of world do we live in today? The answer must give due weight to
the interrelatedness of the present world. This has in no small measure been brought about by the scientific and technological revolution.
~fankind, in the age of the atom and the era of space, has been provided 'vith challenges and responsibilities so aweso1ne as to be almost
different in kind from traditional problems.
But, it is not just a world of science and technology. It is also a
world of morality and law. vVhere there are common moral purposes
and a mutuality of interests, there may be not only international law
and international organization, but there may be a relatively mature
international legal-political system. The needs for a minimum world
public order have been delineated. Foremost among these needs,
other than the more ultimate goal of a legal order more comparable
with a typically advanced national legal order, is an acceptable approach to the use of national force or coercion. Under international
law a nation-state is permitted to pursue its security, defense, and
peace-preserving needs. This function may also, under existing international law, be performed by a collection of nations. Internation1 36
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allaw in order to ensure the safeguarding of essential values is seeking-both where a single nation-state or group of nation-states is
involved-to develop conformity to the concept of proportionality as
controlled by the overriding principle of reasonableness.
With the present proliferation of weapons possessing their vast
volume of violence, the demand for a minimum world order has been
accentuated. As the capacity for violence in all of the dimensions of
the earth has grown, so also there has been a greater awareness of the
need for practical processes to avoid the alternative of violence. Expectations for greater human self-realization, as a parallel cause, have
contributed largely to the same demand.
The concept of the world rule of law has become a rallying point
for the development of suitable legal principles and rules. When buttressed by practical institutions to administer them, this approach
has much relevancy, and international la 'v becomes a part of the
totality of the concept of power.
Space, as man's newest usable environment, is in need of legal
principles, rules, and processes beyond those presently existing, in
order to assist him in achieving his expectations. From the very first
it has been clear that la'v was pertinent to outer space. No matter
what its other characteristics may be, it was never conceived of as a
legal vacuum. Most will agree that in some small measure the development of an international law for space may contribute to a condition in which man's mutual interests will prosper.
The great practical dilemma will be to reconcile the use of space
for scientific and peaceful purposes with other purposes. Military
deterrence must be considered to be a nonaggressive, peace-supporting purpose, along with other defensive military uses. Sharing the
use of space with other nations for these purposes is mutually beneficial. It permits greater exploitation of the space resource; it contributes to the common interests; and, it does not seek to impose any
artificial limitations upon the single scientific and technological unit
which space is conceded to be.
The foregoing conditions are essential to the existence of a minimum world order. Their realization would seem to meet the conditions laid do,vn by Secretary of State Rusk when he enumerated the
conditions of an agreeable community of nations. He said on May 25,
1962, '~we seek a community of nations which recognize their interdependence, a community marked by increasing cooperation, by order,
and by law." 138
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